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The Merchandising Right:  Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?1 
Stacey L. Dogan2 & Mark A. Lemley3 
Trademark merchandising is big business.  One marketing consultant estimated 
the global market for licensing and marketing sports-related merchandise at $17 billion in 
2001.4  The college-logo retail market was estimated at $3 billion in 2003.5  The 2002 
Salt Lake Olympics generated $500 million in gross sales, and $34 million in licensing 
revenues, from sale of “Olympics” attire.6  Even municipal police departments want a 
piece of the action, applying to register their names as trademarks7 and demanding 
                                                 
1   © 2004 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley. 
2   Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. 
3  William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Director, Stanford 
Program in Law, Science and Technology; of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP. 
 Thanks to Rob Denicola, Paul Goldstein and Thomas McCarthy for comments on 
the project or an earlier draft. 
4      Ardi Kolah, Maximising Revenue from Licensing and Merchandising, avail. at 
http://www.sportbusinessassociates.com/sports_reports/Licensing%20and%20Merchandi
sing%20brochure.pdf (last visited July 26, 2004) (also reporting that $200 million of NFL 
merchandise was sold in 2001, and that Manchester United earned $36 million from 
global merchandising fees).   
5 See Jeffrey Zaslow, Sports Fans Snap Up Souvenirs of Winners Beating Losers:  
Mascots Boiled or Grilled?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at A1.  Another report recently 
estimated that universities collect over $2.5 billion annually in revenues from officially 
licensed products.  Glenn Bacal & Sean Johnson, Collegiate Trademark Licensing:  The 
Basic Rules of the Game, published online by Office of General Counsel, Arizona State 
University, at http://www.asu.edu/counsel/brief/trademark.html#N_2_ (last visited July 
26, 2004).  See C. Knox Withers, Sine Qua Non: Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of 
Confusion, and the Business of Collegiate Licensing, 11 J. Intell. Prop. L. 421, 422 
(2004) (suggesting $2.7 billion in collegiate revenue). 
6 International Olympic Committee, Salt Lake 2002 Licensing, in Marketing Matters:  
The Olympic Marketing Newsletter, p. 4, avail. at 
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_456.pdf 
7 See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Application Serial 
Number 75,791,989 (filed Sept. 2, 1999) (application to register “LAPD” for use on 
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royalties from television programs designed to evoke their image.8  Want to wear a hat 
showing your support for your college or favorite baseball team?  Want to wear a T-shirt 
emblazoned with the word “Barbie” or the “Harley-Davidson” logo?  You may have no 
choice but to get an officially licensed piece of gear, at least if trademark owners have 
their way.9 
                                                                                                                                                 
clothing and children’s clothing); United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark 
Application Serial Number 76,342,567 (filed Nov. 28, 2001) (opposition pending as of 
July 27, 2004) (application to register “NYPD” for use on clothing, housewares and 
glasses, furniture, jewelry, keyrings, mousepads, and a host of other merchandise). 
8 The New York and Los Angeles police departments have reportedly begun to demand 
royalties for the use of the NYPD and LAPD names.  According to a New York police 
department spokesperson, “‘[w]e’re concerned about the marketing logo, what people do 
with it, and what it indicates.  If they do [use it] they either enter into an agreement and, if 
they don’t, we sue.’” Bridget Byrne, Real Cops on TV Beat, Eonline, Aug. 5, 2002, avail. 
at http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,10347,00.html (last visited July 27, 2004).   
See also Dana Calvo & Richard Winton, Impersonating an Officer Could Be Costly in 
Los Angeles; Unlike in the days of ‘Dragnet,’ two new shows may be charged licensing 
fees to use the LAPD name, L.A. Times (Calendar), July 31, 2002, at 1 (“In a break with 
tradition, City Atty. Rocky Delgadillo has asked the networks that air two new L.A.-
based police TV shows to pay licensing fees or risk legal action, saying the city in the 
past has ‘basically been lazy about its intellectual property’ rights under trademark 
law.”). 
9   Trademark holders have not limited their zeal to merchandising cases, but behave 
generally as though their rights to their brand names and logos are all but absolute.  Some 
trademark holders have attempted to sue anyone who makes use of the term, even in 
contexts like parody or criticism that pose no threat of consumer confusion, the 
traditional touchstone for trademark infringement claims.  Trademark laws have been 
used to preclude artists from painting in the same style as another, Romm Art Creations 
Ltd. v. Simcha Int’l 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); to prevent an author from using 
the term “Godzilla” in the title of his book about Godzilla, notwithstanding prominent 
disclaimers, see Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801 (C.D. Cal. 
1998); to prevent a comic book from featuring a character known as Hell’s Angel, see 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993) (detailing the 
trademark suit and the settlement); to prevent a satirical political advertisement from 
using the “Michelob” trademark to help make its point, see Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci 
Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); to prevent a tractor manufacturer from making 
fun of its competitor’s logo in an advertisement, see Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 
39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994); to prevent a movie about a Minnesota beauty pageant from 
using the title “Dairy Queens,” see American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 
F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998); to prevent a political satire of the O.J. Simpson case 
Merchandising Right  Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
 3 
With this much money at stake, it’s no surprise that trademark holders demand 
royalties for use of “their” marks on shirts, keychains, jewelry, and related consumer 
products.  After all, the value of these products comes largely from the allure of the 
trademarks, and it seems only fair to reward the party that created that value…doesn’t it? 
It turns out that the answer is more complicated than this intuitive account would 
predict.  Trademark law historically has existed primarily to protect against the consumer 
deception that occurs when one party attempts to pass off its products as those of 
another.10  From an economic and policy perspective, it is by no means obvious that 
                                                                                                                                                 
called “The Cat NOT in the Hat!”, see Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 
F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1997); to prevent individuals from setting up web pages critical 
of a company or product, see Ohio Art Co. v. Watts, No. 98 CV 7338, slip op. at 4 (N.D. 
Ohio June 23, 1998); BellSouth Corp. v. Internet Classified of Ohio, No. 1:96-CV-0769-
CC, slip op. at 29-30 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 1997); and to prevent a theme bar from calling 
itself “The Velvet Elvis,” see Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 
1998).  In still other cases, plaintiffs have tried without success to prevent a variety of 
artists, authors, political groups, news agencies, and others from using their trademarks. 
See, e.g., Fox News Network v. Penguin Group, 2003 WL 23281520 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 
2003) (attempt to prevent political humor book from using the phrase “fair and balanced” 
in its title); Mastercard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (attempt to enjoin political speech in a presidential campaign that 
parodied a trademark); American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 
(N.D. Ohio 2002) (same); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302 
(9th Cir. 1992) (attempt to prevent a newspaper from referring to the band “New Kids on 
the Block” in a for-profit telephone poll); Lyons Partnership v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 
2d 947 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (attempt to prohibit a comedy routine by the San Diego Chicken 
in which it beat up a Barney character); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 
931 (D.D.C. 1985) (attempt to prohibit the use of the term “Star Wars” to describe the 
Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative); Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters 
Mfg., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (attempt to enjoin printing, distribution and 
sale of a poster showing a pregnant girl in a Girl Scout uniform with the caption “Be 
Prepared”). Those suits have been discussed in great deal elsewhere, and they will not 
concern us further here.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the 
Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast With 
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 Yale L.J. 1717 (1999); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999).   
10 The law also protects against confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship, but there, too, 
the cause of action turns on the existence of confusion in the marketplace.  See infra 
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trademark holders should have exclusive rights over the sale of products that use marks 
for their ornamental or “intrinsic” value, rather than as indicators of source or official 
sponsorship.11  Trademark law seeks to promote, rather than hinder, truthful competition 
in markets for products sought by consumers; if a trademark is the product, then giving 
one party exclusive rights over it runs in tension with the law’s pro-competitive goals, 
frequently without any deception-related justification.12  On the other hand, there may be 
circumstances in which consumers expect that trademark holders sponsored or produced 
products bearing their mark, in which case use of the mark by others – even as a part of a 
product – might result in genuine confusion.13  At the very least, the fact that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
notes __-__ and accompanying text; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks, 
§ 18.39-18.40 (describing distinction between “source theory” of protection and “quality 
theory” of protection).  Federal dilution law, which protects against the “whittling away” 
or tarnishment of a famous trademark’s distinctiveness, will rarely come into play in 
merchandising cases.  See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
11 See International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) (“It is not uncommon for a name or emblem 
that serves in one context as a collective mark or trademark also to be merchandised for 
its own intrinsic utility to consumers.”).  Of course, trademarks sometimes serve a dual 
function, as source identifier and as an integral aesthetic feature of the product.  In these 
cases, the interests of truthfulness and robust competition run into tension with one 
another, and the solution becomes more challenging.  We discuss such cases infra notes 
__-__ and accompanying text. 
12 Imagine, for example, that I am a Dallas Cowboys fan who wants to wear a Cowboys t-
shirt to show my support for the team.  In that case, the trademark is an essential part of 
the product I’m seeking – I am not looking to buy just any t-shirt, but a t-shirt with 
COWBOYS as its defining feature.  And I may or may not assume (or care) that the 
Cowboys themselves had any relationship to the sale or manufacture of the shirt.  See 
Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of 
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 603, 604 (1984) (noting that items with logos 
sell despite their high price relative to other items of similar quality). See generally Alex 
Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 961 (1993) (discussing the 
“growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify products but also to enhance or 
adorn them, even to create new commodities altogether”). 
13 See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F. 
Supp. 507, 515 (D.N.J. 1986) (survey showed that up to 67% of football fans were 
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trademark constitutes part of the product, rather than purely an indication of source, 
complicates the analysis, raising a tension between the dual goals of trademark law.14 
Given these complexities, together with the economic interests at stake, one might 
expect that the law and practice of merchandising rights would be well-settled and reflect 
a considered balancing of the interests of trademark holders and their competitors.  In 
reality, however, much of the multi-billion dollar industry of merchandise licensing has 
grown around a handful of cases from the 1970s and 1980s that established 
merchandising rights with little regard for the competing legal or policy concerns at 
stake.  Those cases are far from settled law – indeed, at least as many decisions decline to 
give trademark owners the right to control sales of their trademarks as products.  We 
think it is high time to revisit that case law and to reconsider the theoretical justifications 
for a merchandising right. 
That review provides little support for trademark owners’ assumptions about 
merchandising.  Doctrinally, the most broad-reaching merchandising cases – which 
presumed infringement based on the public recognition of the mark as a trademark15 – 
were simply wrong in their analysis of trademark infringement and have been specifically 
                                                                                                                                                 
confused as to the NFL’s sponsorship of GIANTS merchandise); cf. National Football 
League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 
1982) (up to 53.6% of consumers who saw defendant’s replicas of NFL jerseys believed 
that the use required permission from the NFL). 
14 See Denicola, supra note __, at 611; Bone, supra note __, [draft at 67-68]. 
15 “The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark 
symbols were in the plaintiffs satisfies the requirements of the act.”  Boston Professional 
Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) 
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
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rejected by subsequent decisions.16  Philosophically, even a merchandising right that 
hinges on likelihood of confusion raises competition-related concerns that should affect 
courts’ analysis of both the merits and appropriate remedies in merchandising cases.  
Perhaps most importantly, recent Supreme Court case law suggests that, if it had the 
opportunity to evaluate the merchandising theory (something it has never done), the 
Court would deny the existence of such a right.  Further, the Court would be right to do 
so.  When a trademark is sold, not as a source indicator, but as a desirable feature of a 
product, competition suffers – and consumers pay – if other sellers are shut out of the 
market for that feature.17  
In Part I, we discuss the historic background and general principles of trademark 
law, and trace the growth of the merchandising right theory from the 1970s through the 
present, when the assumption of a merchandising right has become a standard part of 
business practice.  In Part II, we explore the legal and theoretical viability of such a 
                                                 
16 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
17 Robert Bone has aptly pointed out that product markets are hard to define in these 
cases, and that competition won’t suffer if the trademark is competing as but one of many 
competing ornamental features on the relevant product. But this seems unlikely in the 
merchandising cases.  A Dallas Cowboys fan won’t be satisfied with a Washington 
Redskins T-shirt instead. If there is an identifiable product market, in the sense that the 
trademark holder can command an above-market price because of the feature, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that some remedy short of an injunction – such as a 
disclaimer – is most appropriate to alleviate any confusion.  See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989); cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 
(“Doubtless a state may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether 
patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent 
customers from being misled as to the source, … [b]ut because of the federal patent laws 
a State may not … prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such 
copying.”); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001) 
(asserting categorically that trademark protection may not extend to functional features 
even if consumers associate them with a particular source).  Even the courts that find 
clear evidence of trademark confusion have not engaged in this second level of analysis. 
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claim.  We find the basis for an absolute merchandising right quite weak.  The 
justifications offered for a merchandising right tend to be circular, and to assume that 
because it is possible to capture value by using a brand, the trademark owner must own 
the right to control that value.  Making this assumption relegates competition and 
consumer search costs to secondary status.  While the question is not free from doubt, 
and there are arguable justifications for limited protection in certain circumstances, the 
concerns we discuss in this section do not justify a general merchandising right.  Finally, 
Part III considers how the Supreme Court would treat the merchandising theory if it were 
presented with such a case.  Recent Supreme Court trademark cases suggest that the 
Court is quite concerned to protect competition against expansive readings of the 
trademark right, an approach that suggests that it would not look kindly on the 
merchandising theory.   
     
I. Origins of the Merchandising Right:  From Trademark as Brand to 
Trademark as Product 
A. Trademarks, Confusion, and Competition 
“Trademarks have existed for almost as long as trade itself.”18  From the earliest 
days in which merchants made and sold goods for consumption by others, sellers have 
used names and other symbols to indicate the source of their wares.19  These “marks” 
                                                 
18 Merges et al., supra note __, at 529; see also Frank Schechter, The Historical 
Foundations of the Law Relating to Trademarks (1925) (tracing history of trademark 
law to medieval times). 
19 Merges et al., supra note __, at 529.  We refer to “trademarks” in this paper, but the 
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serve an important economic function:  they enable sellers to develop reputations for 
quality, and assure customers that products sold under the seller’s brand will live up to 
that reputation.  Trademarks, in other words, provide convenient, truthful product 
information in easily accessible form.20   
To fulfill their informational objectives, trademarks require some form of legal 
protection.  A brand-based assurance of quality would mean nothing if imitators could 
apply it to their own products and pass them off as having come from the trademark 
holder.  The result would be higher search costs for consumers and a disincentive to firms 
to invest in goodwill and quality products and services.  Trademark law evolved 
specifically to avoid this result.  Doctrinally, trademark law prevents interlopers from 
appropriating trademark holders’ goodwill by using their marks in a way that suggests 
some association, affiliation, or sponsorship between the parties or their products.  
Economically, trademark law reduces consumer search costs and facilitates investment in 
goodwill by protecting the accuracy of trademark-related investments in advertising and 
product quality.21   
                                                                                                                                                 
law and policies that we discuss apply equally to service marks, which are used to 
distinguish the services of one party from those of another.  See 45 U.S.C. § 1127. 
20 For a more expansive discussion of the economics of trademark law, see Stacey L. 
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 43 
Hous. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004); see also See William Landes & Richard Posner, 
The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 167 (2003); William Landes & 
Richard Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & Econ. 265, 268-
70 (1987); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1690-93 (1999) (describing economic justifications for trademarks 
and advertising); Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, __ VA. L. 
REV. __ (forthcoming 2004) (draft at 9-12).  The informational function of trademarks is 
particularly important for products whose salient characteristics are not evident upon 
inspection.  See, e.g., Bone, supra, at [draft at 11-12]. 
21 Not all commentators view the by-products of trademark law as desirable.  In 
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While the reduction of consumer search costs and the encouragement of goodwill 
investment represent critical intermediate objectives of the trademark system, neither of 
these goals is an end in and of itself.  The law reduces consumer search costs in order to 
facilitate the functioning of a competitive marketplace.  Informed consumers will make 
better-informed purchases, which will increase their overall utility and push producers to 
develop better quality products.22  Trademark law, then, aims to promote more 
competitive markets by improving the quality of information in those markets.23   
The primacy of competition in trademark law stands in stark contrast with other 
areas of intellectual property law, which insulate creators from competition in order to 
encourage future acts of creation.24  Copyright and patent law offer creators exclusive 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular, an influential scholarly movement in the early 1900s criticized trademark law 
for its tendency to encourage wasteful expenditures on advertisements that resulted in 
product differentiation and noncompetitive pricing.  See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., 
Advertising and the Public Interest:  Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale 
L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948) (“Considering the economic welfare of the community as a 
whole, to use up part of the national product persuading people to buy product A rather 
than product B appears to be a waste of resources.”); see also Lunney, Trademark 
Monopolies, supra note __.   
22 Indeed, classical economics requires fully informed buyers and sellers as a condition 
for a perfectly competitive economy.  See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping Competition 
on the Internet:  Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1965, 
1968 (2000) (describing conditions for perfectly competitive market). 
23 Cf. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“the Lanham Act must be construed in light of a strong federal policy in favor of 
vigorously competitive markets, which is exemplified by the Sherman Act and other anti-
trust laws”). 
24  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (setting forth exclusive rights of copyright holders); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271 (defining exclusive rights of patent holders).  The exclusive rights offered by 
copyright and patent law do not necessarily give the rights-holder economic power in any 
relevant market, because in most cases, the creator’s work faces competition from other 
products that serve a similar market demand.  See, e.g., 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP 
and Antitrust § 4.2 (2004 ed.) (pointing out that most patents and copyrights do not 
confer market power in a relevant market).  Nonetheless, the laws give rights-holders the 
Merchandising Right  Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
 10 
economic rights to cure the presumed market failure that would result if copiers could 
replicate expressive works and inventions without incurring the costs of their 
development.25  As such, these regimes were created specifically to encourage the 
creation of intrinsically valuable products.  Trademark law quite consciously does not 
serve this goal; both its philosophy and its structure eschew the notion that trademark 
rights should serve as either an inducement or a reward for the creation of product 
features that have inherent – as opposed to source-identifying – value.26 
While the reach of trademark law has expanded over the centuries, the law has 
                                                                                                                                                 
ability to exclude others from copying product features that consumers may demand for 
their inherent qualities.  And if they succeed in creating incentives, it is because they 
permit creators to price in excess of marginal cost. 
25 See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Intellectual Property, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853 (1992). 
26 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) 
(“‘The Lanham Act,’ we have said, ‘does not exist to reward manufacturers for their 
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its 
period of exclusivity.’”) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 
U.S. 23, 34 (2001)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (prohibiting the registration of any 
trademark that “comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional”); Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“It is the province of patent law, not 
trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new 
product designs or functions for a limited time, … after which competitors are free to use 
the innovation.”).  Of course, distinguishing between the inherent and source-identifying 
functions of a particular product feature can be daunting.  See, e.g., Bone, supra note __, 
at [draft at 80-81] (distinguishing between consumption value and source-identification 
function of particular product features).   
 The structure of trademark law is also ill-suited to protection of appealing product 
features.  Unlike copyright and patent rights, which expire after a defined term, trademark 
law provides protection for as long as the mark serves as a source-indicator.  As a result, 
when trademark law extends to product features that have intrinsic value, the trademark 
holder can obtain a potentially perpetual monopoly over those product features.  Cf. 
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65 (“If a product’s functional features could be used as 
trademarks, … a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to 
whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may 
be renewed in perpetuity).”). 
Merchandising Right  Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
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generally maintained its emphasis on promoting linguistic clarity and preventing 
confusion and misinformation in the sales process.27  Initially, trademark law applied 
only to word marks, and conferred only the right to prevent competitors from using the 
mark on directly competing goods.28  Over time, however, trademark law has expanded 
both in subject matter and in scope.  Federal trademark and unfair competition law now 
extend to product packaging, logos, and even the shape and features of products if 
consumers view these features as source-indicators.29  And often consumers do use these 
product features to identify source, at least with respect to certain well-known products:  
a chocolate aficionado, for example, would recognize immediately the shape and 
packaging of a Hershey’s KissTM, and would expect such a morsel to have the distinctive 
flavor associated with Hershey’s.   
Just as trademark subject matter has expanded, so has the range of uses that can 
                                                 
27 Initially, the law protected only against deception as to “the physical source or origin of 
the product or service with which the trademark was used.”  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 18:39, at p. 18-60 (1999).  Over time, however, the 
courts recognized that trademarks could indicate quality as well as source, and extended 
protection to marks, such as franchise names, that indicated some consistent level of 
quality products or services.  Id. at § 18:40.  Further, the nationalization and 
internationalization of sales means that consumers can recognize and rely upon brands 
even if they don’t know the actual source of the goods, so long as they understand that 
goods with the brand come from a consistent source.  The law changed in 1984 to take 
account of this development.  15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (amending genericness rule to 
overrule Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 682 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 
1982)).  In his treatise, McCarthy characterizes the shift as a move from a “source 
theory” of trademark protection toward a “quality theory.”  Id. 
 More recently, Congress created a new right for owners of famous marks, to 
prevent uses that “dilute” the distinctiveness of their marks.  This right, too, finds some 
basis in the search costs rationale.  See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks 
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 43 Hous. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004) 
28 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916). 
29 McCarthy, supra note __, at § 1:17. 
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subject one to an infringement or unfair competition claim.30  From its origins – in which 
infringement required the use of a similar mark on a directly competing product – 
trademark law has expanded to control uses of a trademark on different but related goods 
“such that the ordinary buyer would be likely to think there was some connection or 
sponsorship between the producers or sellers of goods bearing a similar mark, even 
though the goods were non-competitive.”31  Trademark law, then, comes into play 
whenever consumers would presume affiliation, sponsorship, or other association 
between the trademark holder and another party selling goods under a similar mark.32  
The law no longer limits itself to cases of “passing off” goods as manufactured or 
produced by the trademark holder.33 
In the abstract, neither of these expansions departs from trademark law’s core 
focus on facilitating the flow of truthful information and reducing consumer search costs.  
If consumers in fact perceive distinctive packaging as an indication of the qualities or 
source of the goods inside, then allowing trademark holders to prevent others from using 
                                                 
30 The Lanham Act includes separate provisions for “infringement” of registered marks, 
on the one hand, and unfair competition through the use of confusingly similar symbols 
or devices, on the other.  Compare 45 U.S.C. § 1114 (providing a cause of action for 
infringement of registered marks) with 45 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (setting forth the standards 
for an unfair competition claim).  For all practical purposes, however, the standards for 
infringement and unfair competition are identical, both turning on the existence of 
confusion as to affiliation, source, or sponsorship.  The only significant difference for 
infringement purposes is the burden of proof: registered marks are presumed valid. 
31 McCarthy, supra note __, at § 24:2; see also Bone, supra note __, at [draft at 55-68]. 
32 Congress codified this expansion in the Lanham Act, providing a cause of action 
against any person who falsely implies an “affiliation, connection or association” with a 
trademark holder, or causes confusion “as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities….”  45 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
33 More recently, Congress has extended federal trademark law to protect famous marks 
against the dilution of their distinctiveness.  See infra notes __-__ and accompanying 
text. 
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the same packaging will help consumers cheaply and easily to identify products from a 
consistent source.  Similarly, if consumers view a mark as an indicator of consistent 
product quality, particularly in an economic environment in which companies regularly 
sell a large range of goods, it makes sense to enjoin confusing uses of the mark by sellers 
of related products, since consumers will suffer if their quality expectations are 
inaccurate.34   
In combination, however, extending legal protection both to trade dress and to 
confusion based on sponsorship raises unique competition-related concerns that 
complicate the effect of such protection on the competitive process.  As trademark law 
begins to protect not only the brand name for a product, but the product itself, it risks 
hindering competition rather than promoting it.  If a manufacturer could use trademark 
law to prevent the copying of features that made its product superior in form or 
craftsmanship, consumers would suffer, because competitors could never enter the 
market for those features and drive prices down.35  The move from protecting trademark 
as label to trademark as mixed label-and-product, then, can have an ambiguous effect on 
competition:  while it can potentially reduce search costs by facilitating product 
identification and reducing marketplace confusion, it can also directly hinder competition 
“on the merits” in the sale of products. 
                                                 
34 This harm has both short-term and long-term dimensions.  In the short term, consumers 
may suffer if the quality of a product fails to meet their expectations.  Over the long term, 
if consumers learn that they cannot count on the trademark as a reliable indicator of 
quality, they will have to engage in more costly means of acquiring information about the 
quality of products.  This latter effect represents the type of increase in consumer search 
costs that the trademark laws seek to avoid. 
35 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001). 
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Trademark law has so far accommodated these competing concerns in two ways.  
First, with respect to product configuration (as opposed to packaging) trade dress, the 
Supreme Court recently clarified that protection applies only to features that actually, and 
demonstrably, indicate source to consumers.  To claim trademark protection for a product 
feature, the claimant must prove that the feature has acquired secondary meaning, “which 
occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to 
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’”36  If a product feature 
has achieved this status, the search costs rationale argues in favor of trademark 
protection, at least in the absence of some countervailing consideration.37  Second, even if 
a product feature has acquired secondary meaning, the “functionality” doctrine precludes 
protection if “its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with 
legitimate (non-trademark-related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use 
of an important product ingredient.”38  The Supreme Court views functionality as the 
ultimate guardian of marketplace competition, and has, of late, repeatedly emphasized its 
significance.39  In tandem, the secondary meaning requirement and functionality doctrine 
                                                 
36 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 595 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (quoting Inwood 
Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 851, n.11 (1982)).  The trademark holder must 
also identify with particularity the features for which it seeks protection.  Cf. Maharishi 
Hardy Blechman Ltd. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 535, 549-50 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting trade dress claim based on product line that reflected 
inconsistency in product features). 
37 In other words, when a product feature has acquired secondary meaning, there is a risk 
that use of the feature by other sellers could confuse consumers as to source or 
sponsorship.   
38 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170. 
39 See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164 (“The functionality doctrine prevents trademark 
law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead 
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product 
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ensure that trademark law limits feature-based competition only when consumer 
expectations suggest that confusion is likely, and even then the primacy of competition 
requires that competitors have access to product features that are necessary to a 
competitive product market.  We mention them here for two reasons:  to emphasize that 
trademark law should have nothing to say about behavior that does not tamper with the 
clarity of information about who makes or sponsors products; and to reiterate that the law 
values such clarity only as long as it serves to promote a more competitive marketplace. 
 
B. The Merchandising Right and Trademark as Product 
Against this backdrop, the so-called “merchandising right” is something of an 
anomaly.  When fans buy t-shirts with the name of their school, team, or rock band, they 
are almost always buying a product bearing an established mark entitled to some form of 
trademark protection.40  But the mark in these cases is rarely serving the traditional 
function of a trademark.  Rather than indicating something to the consumer about the 
                                                                                                                                                 
feature.”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001) 
(“The Lanham Act … does not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because 
an investment has been made to encourage the public to associate a particular functional 
feature with a single manufacturer or seller.”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 775 
(the functionality doctrine “serves to assure that competition will not be stifled by the 
exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses”).   
40 Typically, the mark has acquired trademark status through use in connection with some 
other primary activity, such as baseball entertainment services, educational services, or 
music performance.  As such, the mark serves as a source-indicator with respect to these 
services, and the trademark holder would have the right to prevent use of the mark on 
similar services or products.  
 By contrast, in Japan and increasingly in the United States people will sometimes 
buy T-shirts that display either an invented logo (one that doesn’t in fact brand a real 
product) or a random collection of words.  The case for merchandising protection for 
such invented logos is even weaker than for established trademarks.   
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source or sponsorship of a product, the mark is the product, or at least is a critical part of 
what makes the product attractive.  While the mark may, on occasion, also signal 
something about the source or sponsorship of the shirt, its function transcends the role of 
a traditional trademark.  Merchandising cases therefore represent a kind of hybrid 
between product configuration and word-based trademark infringement claims:  they 
generally involve protected marks, but the marks are more product features than brands. 
For years, most trademark holders did not complain about such uses of their 
marks by unaffiliated parties.  The Boston Athletic Association, which had operated the 
Boston Marathon since 1897, waited until the mid-1980s to object to the sale of 
BOSTON MARATHON merchandise by third parties.41  The University of Pittsburgh 
acquiesced in Champion Products’ sale of PITT merchandise from 1936 until 1981, when 
it filed a trademark infringement suit.42  It appears that the 1970s and 1980s represented 
an era of awakening, in which trademark holders came to realize the economic value of 
their marks on merchandise and the revenues that they could earn through licensing if 
they were entitled to control the use of those marks.43  In the decades since, the 
awakening has only spread, to the point at which even municipal police departments are 
                                                 
41 See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1989). 
42 See University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 464 (D. Pa. 
1982) (noting that University of Pittsburgh failed to object to unlicensed sales of PITT 
merchandise from 1936 until 1980); see also University Book Store et al. v. Board of 
Regents of University of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *10 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (noting 
that University of Wisconsin had, “over the years, tolerated sales and advertising of 
goods, including clothing, bearing the marks” it sought to register in 1988). 
43 Some of the sports leagues may have come to the realization a bit earlier.  The National 
Football League, for example, established NFL Properties in 1963 expressly “to act as a 
licensing representative for the trademarks and other commercial identifications of the 
member clubs.”  National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, 
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982). 
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entering the world of trademark licensing.44   
 
C. The Shaky Foundations of the Merchandising Right 
What explains the explosive growth of the licensing market for trademark 
merchandise?  The answer appears to lie in a handful of judicial decisions from the 1970s 
and 1980s.   
1975 was a banner year in the law of trademark merchandising.  During that year, 
both the National Hockey League and the National Football League persuaded courts to 
enjoin the sale of unlicensed emblems bearing the marks of their member teams.45  While 
the Fifth Circuit NHL case received the most attention, the Illinois state court decision in 
the football case offered a more plausible – but more limited – theoretical justification for 
its extension of trademark doctrine.46  Together, the cases likely fueled the interest among 
trademark holders in obtaining royalties from the sale of their marks.  
In Boston Hockey v. Dallas Cap & Emblem,47 the National Hockey League and 
several of its member clubs brought suit to enjoin the manufacture and sale of emblems 
bearing their trademarks.48  The district court found no infringement, reasoning that 
                                                 
44 See supra __-__. 
45 National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 
242, 247 (Ill. App. 1975); Boston Hockey v. Emblem Cap, 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 
1975).   
46 See infra note __ and accompanying text. 
47 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
48 Id. at 1008. 
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consumers did not necessarily expect an affiliation between the emblem seller and the 
hockey teams,49 and that in any event, the functionality doctrine required competitors to 
have access to trademarks that served as ornamental features on products.50 
The Fifth Circuit’s reversal broke new theoretical ground and effectively wrote 
the confusion requirement out of the Lanham Act.  While conceding the centrality of 
confusion to trademark infringement claims,51 the court found the district court’s concept 
of confusion unduly narrow: 
It can be said that the public buyer knew that the emblems portrayed the 
teams' symbols. Thus, it can be argued, the buyer is not confused or 
deceived. This argument misplaces the purpose of the confusion 
requirement. The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that 
the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the 
public knowing that the public would identify them as being the teams' 
trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin 
of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the 
act. The argument that confusion must be as to the source of the 
manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, 
originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the 
emblem.52 
The court, in other words, presumed actionable confusion based solely on the 
                                                 
49 Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 
459, 462-63 (D. Tex. 1973) (“The test is not whether the products in question are 
duplications of their marks, but whether the defendant’s use of the mark would mislead 
the public as to the source of the goods.”), rev’d, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). 
50 Id. at 463; see also id. at 464 (“The marks have achieved intrinsic value to a segment of 
the consuming public which may be attracted to their aesthetic features and to their 
characteristics as a patch to be used on apparel or for collecting. … In this area of the 
economy the protection of trademark law must give way to the public policy favoring 
free competition.”).  Recognizing, however, the possibility that at least some consumers 
might assume that the NHL had officially licensed the products, the court entered a 
limited injunction requiring a disclaimer of any association between the manufacturer and 
the NFL or its teams.  Id. at 465. 
51 510 F.2d 1012. 
52 Id. (emphasis added). 
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consumer’s mental association between the trademark and the trademark holder.  
Likelihood of confusion, in the Boston Hockey definition, turns not on whether 
consumers have any misperception about where a product comes from or whether the 
trademark holder has endorsed it.  On this approach, confusion exists by definition if the 
trademark comprises “the triggering mechanism” in the sale.53   
What justified this shift in trademark theory?  Without specifically addressing the 
district court’s analysis of functionality, and while acknowledging that its decision “may 
slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the public to the protection 
of business interests of plaintiffs,” the court pointed to “three persuasive points” in 
support of its decision.   
First, the major commercial value of the emblems is derived from the 
efforts of plaintiffs.  Second, defendant sought and would have asserted, if 
obtained, an exclusive right to make and sell the emblems.  Third, the sale 
of a reproduction of the trademark itself on an emblem is an accepted use 
of such team symbols in connection with the type of activity in which the 
business of professional sports is engaged.54 
The second point is irrelevant,55 and the third circular:  it amounts to arguing that 
allowing trademark holders to claim a royalty on merchandise bearing their marks is 
desirable because it’s what trademark holders already do.56  None of these explanations 
even attempts to address the effect of such a right on consumers, on competitors, or on 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 510 F.2d at 1011. 
55 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 & n.18 (1994) (fact that 
party had unsuccessfully requested a license to use a copyrighted work should not weigh 
against fair use when the work is later used without permission). 
56 We address the “existing practices” argument in more detail infra note __-__ and 
accompanying text. 
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the competitiveness of the marketplace as a whole – i.e., on the core values of trademark 
law.  The court’s justification for departing from those core values quickly collapses to its 
first point – defendants are capturing commercial value that ought to belong to the 
plaintiffs. The decision – and indeed the merchandising theory altogether – finds its 
normative justification in an instinctive reaction against “unjust enrichment.” 
Subsequent decisions and commentaries have condemned the Boston Hockey 
court’s approach to likelihood of confusion in merchandise cases.57  Rather than 
presuming confusion based on the use of a known trademark, many if not most courts 
have required trademark holders to establish a genuine likelihood that the use will 
confuse consumers as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation.58  Without proof that 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (criticizing 
Boston Hockey for its “reli[ance] upon a novel and overly broad conception of the rights 
that a trademark entails”); International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 
633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing decision as “an extraordinary extension of 
the protection heretofore afforded trademark owners”); Bi-Rite Enters, Inc. v. Button 
Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); See Brown & Denicola at 691 (7th 
ed. 1998), noting that “Boston Hockey has been distinguished and limited in later 
decisions for its loose interpretation of the confusion requirement”); Withers, supra note 
__, at 453; Mark A. Kahn, May the Best Merchandise Win: The Law of Non-Trademark 
Uses of Sports Logos, 14 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 283, 302-09 (2004).   
58 See, e.g., University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 464 (D. Pa. 
1982); International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 
1980); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. 
Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (“Likelihood of confusion in a sponsorship context 
focuses on the product bearing the allegedly infringing marks and asks whether the public 
believes the product bearing the mark originates with or is somehow endorsed or 
authorized by the plaintiff.”).  The Fifth Circuit itself subsequently adopted this standard 
and thus narrowed, at least implicitly, the Boston Hockey holding.  See Supreme 
Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1082 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 
388 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Trademark infringement occurs only when the use sought to be 
enjoined is likely to confuse purchasers with respect to such things as the product’s 
source, its endorsement by the plaintiff, or its connection with the plaintiff.”).   
The Restatement of Unfair Competition also impliedly rejects the merchandising 
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consumers view a given use of a trademark as an indication of official sponsorship, these 
claims generally fail.  In Board of Governors of University of North Carolina v. 
Helpingstine,59 for example, the court rejected UNC’s infringement suit against a t-shirt 
manufacturer, based on a failure of proof that consumers viewed the shirts as sponsored 
by the university:   
Given that there is a distinct possibility that individuals who buy products 
from Johnny T-Shirt do not base their decision upon whether the product is 
sponsored or endorsed by UNC-CH and that plaintiffs bear the burden of 
establishing likelihood of confusion, the court holds that UNC-CH must meet its 
burden by showing more than simply the identity of the marks.  Instead, it must 
provide evidence establishing that individuals do make the critical distinction as 
to sponsorship or endorsement, or direct evidence of actual confusion.60   
Other courts applying the confusion-based standard have similarly rejected the trademark 
holder’s claims.61   
Of the post-Boston Hockey courts that have found a likelihood of confusion in 
merchandising cases, most have based their decisions not on a new general right to 
                                                                                                                                                 
theory, stating in §25(1) that “one may be subject to liability under the law of trademarks 
for the use of a designation that resembles the trademark of another without proof of a 
likelihood of confusion only under an applicable antidilution statute.”  Comment i. then 
goes on to state that “use . . . as mere ornamentation on the subsequent user’s goods does 
not dilute the distinctiveness of the mark by associating the mark as a symbol of 
identification with different goods or services.” 
59 714 F. Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989). 
60 Id. at 173 (citing McCarthy, supra note __, at ¶ 24:3 at 172). 
61 See, e.g., Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow Girls, 676 F.2d at 1083; University of 
Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Pa. 1982); International 
Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980); Board of 
Governors of University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 
(M.D.N.C. 1989).   
In a related context, a court recently refused to enjoin the sale of logos themselves 
as clip art.  See Medic Alert Foundation v. Corel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 933 (N.D. Ill. 
1999).  The court rejected the claim based on the absence of consumer confusion.  
Professor McCarthy endorses this result.  McCarthy, supra note __, at 25:52.1. 
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prevent unjust enrichment or control merchandising, but on evidence that the public 
actually believed the trademark holder licensed the defendant’s products.62  This form of 
“sponsorship confusion” was the theoretical basis for the NFL’s Illinois emblem suit in 
1975. While the Illinois court was less than exacting in its analysis of the facts,63 later 
rulings in NFL suits have turned upon surveys and other evidence indicating the 
widespread belief that team-related jerseys are officially licensed by the League.64 
Despite a general move away from its broadest reading, however, the residual 
effects of Boston Hockey remain, and later decisions sometimes fall back upon its 
conclusory language about the right of a trademark holder to control any uses that benefit 
from its mark’s goodwill.65  Others, apparently moved by sympathy for the trademark 
                                                 
62 Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Universal Brass, Inc., 1995 WL 420816, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. 1995) (concluding that “actual confusion as to authorization, coupled with 
[defendant’s] use of the [trademark registration] symbol, make it such that no rational 
trier of fact could find that confusion as to Porsche’s sponsorship is unlikely”); National 
Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 659 
(W.D. Wash. 1982). 
63 National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 
242, 246-47 (Ill. App. 1975) (basing likelihood of confusion conclusion upon the NFL’s 
extensive licensing practices, through which “the buying public has come to associate the 
trademark with the sponsorship of the NFL or of the particular team involved”). 
64 See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 
532 F. Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (“Just as the relevant inquiry for the 
establishment of likelihood of confusion in a sponsorship context is the belief that 
sponsorship or authorization was granted, the inquiry should be the same in order to 
establish secondary meaning.”). 
65 See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(“Defendants’ shirts are clearly designed to take advantage of the Boston Marathon and 
to benefit from the good will associated with its promotion by plaintiffs.  Defendants thus 
obtain a ‘free ride’ at plaintiffs’ expense.”); University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. 
Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (enjoining use of BATTLIN’ BULLDOG 
beer, when “the confusion stems not from the defendant’s unfair competition with the 
plaintiff’s products, but from the defendant’s misuse of the plaintiff’s reputation and 
good will as embodied in the plaintiff’s mark”); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 
Merchandising Right  Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
 23 
holder, nominally focus on a likelihood of confusion but stretch the facts or adopt 
unsupported assumptions to conclude that consumers presume an association between the 
trademark holder and goods bearing its mark and will therefore be confused.66   
These decisions, and the general uncertainty in the legal landscape surrounding 
merchandising rights, have no doubt contributed to trademark holders’ intuition in favor 
of a licensing right.  But they offer a rather slender reed on which to build an entire new 
jurisprudence.  A closer look at these cases suggests that trademark holders may be 
relying on a proverbial house of cards.  The fact that courts are at best evenly split as to 
whether a merchandising right even exists, and even more dubious of its existence in the 
absence of consumer confusion,67 makes it all the more surprising that trademark owners, 
                                                                                                                                                 
F.2d 327, 334 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is because of that association, the identification of the 
toy car with its source, Warner’s television series, that the toy car is bought by the public.  
That is enough” for an infringement claim against an imitator.) (emphasis in original); 
Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Sethscot Collection, 2000 WL 34414961, at *9 (“the confusion 
factor is met where, as here, the registered mark … is the triggering mechanism for the 
sale of the product”); cf. University Book Store et al. v. Board of Regents of University 
of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *8 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (criticizing the “antiquated view 
of trademarks as harmful monopolies which must be rigorously confined within 
traditional bounds” as “outmoded and not in accordance with more recent cases”). 
66 See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Given the 
undisputed fact that (1) defendants intentionally referred to the Boston Marathon on its 
shirts, and (2) purchasers were likely to buy the shirts precisely because of that reference, 
we think it fair to presume that purchasers are likely to be confused about the shirt’s 
source or sponsorship.”); cf. University Book Store et al. v. Board of Regents of 
University of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *10 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (acknowledging 
university’s decades-long failure to police the use of its mark on merchandise, and 
nonetheless concluding that “it is undisputed that, to a significant portion of the relevant 
public, the subject marks identify applicant as the primary source of its educational and 
entertainment services and as the secondary source of the apparel imprinted with such 
marks”) (emphasis added). 
67   This doctrinal disagreement is not limited to the United States.  In Arsenal Football 
Club v. Reed, [2003] EWCA Civ. 96 (Ct. App. Chanc.), the European Court of Justice 
established a merchandising right, holding that if both the marks and the goods sold were 
identical it did not matter whether consumers were confused.  The U.K. courts refused to 
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retail businesses and even government officials simply assume the existence of such a 
right.68   
 
II. Does the Merchandising Right Make Sense? 
In this section, we consider the pros and cons of a broad merchandising right, and 
conclude that there is no theoretical and little practical justification for such a right.  At 
best, trademark owners are entitled to prevent a limited range of merchandising uses that 
are likely to confuse consumers.  
 
A. Goodwill and Free Riding 
To begin, we will consider the theory of unjust enrichment or free riding that 
seems to underlie the instincts of courts and trademark owners in many of the 
merchandising cases.  Advocates of the merchandising right justify it by referring to the 
“free riding” that would occur if competitors could sell T-shirts using their logos.  Those 
competitors would be “trading on their goodwill,” and therefore presumably taking 
something that ought as a matter of right to belong to the trademark owner.69  Courts 
                                                                                                                                                 
give effect to this judgment, however, ruling that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ and that Reed’s sale of merchandise featuring the logo of the Arsenal football team 
did not infringe Arsenal’s trademark. 
68 See, e.g., James Cyphers, Companies Join Police in Pursuing T-Shirt Bootleggers, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1991, at B2 (noting law enforcement actions against the sale of t-
shirts bearing trademarks and logos). 
69   Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone: 
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sometimes talk loosely about appropriation of a trademark owner’s goodwill as the harm 
to be prevented.70  In a related vein, Robert Denicola concludes that while a 
merchandising right doesn’t fit well with trademark theory, the trademark owner has a 
better claim to own the right than anyone else, and so deserves the right to control 
merchandising using the trademark.71 
These justifications are circular and ultimately empty.  Denicola’s analysis 
presumes that someone must control this particular segment of the market.  If we start our 
analysis on that basis, it might make sense that the trademark owner is the logical entity 
to exercise that control.72  But there is no reason to start from that presumption.  We do 
not assume that the trademark owner has the right to control parodies, or criticism, or 
referential uses of the mark, or “uses” of a mark based on proximity.73  Trademark rights 
have never given exclusive rights to control all uses of a mark.  They have traditionally 
given trademark owners the right only to prevent uses that confuse consumers, or blur the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brand Equity as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 219, 
238 (1994); Marlene B. Hanson & W. Casey Walls, Protecting Trademark Good Will: 
The Case for a Federal Standard of Misappropriation, 81 Trademark Rptr. 480 (1991).  
Many would trace this notion back to Frank Schechter, who conceived of trademarks as 
property rights long before the notion was in judicial vogue.  See Frank  I. Schechter, The 
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 819 (1927). 
70   See, e.g., Beacon Mutual Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins., 376 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); 1-800 
Contacts v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Brockum Co. v. 
Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (the “unlicensed use of the Rolling 
Stones’ name” on t-shirts “would permit the defendant to reap where it had not sown”). 
71   See Denicola, supra note __, at 640-41. 
72   Even then this conclusion is not inexorable.  Since consumers are the ultimate 
intended beneficiaries of trademark protection, one could argue that it made more sense 
to vest such a right in consumers, not producers. 
73   For a discussion of non-trademark uses that are protected, see Dogan & Lemley, 
supra note __, at __. 
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distinctive significance of the mark, in order to minimize consumer search costs and 
facilitate the functioning of large-scale markets.  Uses of a mark that don’t raise these 
concerns are reserved to the free market.  The merchandising theory expands the rights of 
trademark owners, giving them a new form of control over uses of “their” mark at the 
expense of the background norm of competition.74  That expansion requires some 
justification; in a market economy it is not reasonable to simply assume that someone 
must own the right to compete in particular ways.75 
This justification cannot be found in the notion of “free riding” or appropriation 
of goodwill.  Those notions too assume rather than demonstrate that someone is entitled 
to own a right on which another might free ride.76  We don’t speak of newspapers as “free 
riding” on trade names when they report news about the companies that use those names, 
even though one can imagine a world in which the trademark owner licensed such use.  
Similarly, we don’t speak of gas stations as free riding on competitors when they locate 
across the street from that competitor, or of stores free riding on the anchor tenant of a 
shopping mall by deciding to lease space in that mall.  Companies engaging in all these 
activities are free riding in some sense; they are using the name or reputation of another 
                                                 
74   As Ralph Brown put it, “competition is copying.”  Ralph S. Brown, The Joys of 
Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y 477, 481 (1983).  See also Robert C. Denicola, 
Freedom to Copy, 108 Yale L.J. 1661, 1661 (1999) (“laws that restrain copying . . . 
restrain competition”). 
75   See generally Peter Jaffey, Merchandising and the Law of Trade Marks, 3 INTELL. 
PROP. Q. 240, 240-42 (1998) (noting that trademark law does not support a general 
merchandising right).  
76   Mark Lemley deconstructs the idea of free riding as a justification for an intellectual 
property regime in Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding 
(working paper 2004). 
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company without paying.  But the world is full of free riding.77  The question is whether a 
particular type of conduct causes the kind of harm that trademark law ought to address.78  
Simply announcing that a particular use of a trademark is an improper appropriation of 
the trademark owner’s goodwill assumes the conclusion.79 
The problem is not simply that we can’t find an affirmative reason to grant 
trademark owners a merchandising right.  Doing so can actually interfere with the 
fundamental goals of trademark law, as we discuss in the next section. 
 
                                                 
77   See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 167 (1992) ("A culture could not exist if all 
free riding were prohibited within it."); see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“In general, unless an intellectual property right 
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.  … Allowing 
competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances.”). 
78  Certainly, free riding may sometimes threaten incentives or distort information in the 
marketplace.  But the structure of our intellectual property system already addresses these 
forms of free riding, in a way that strikes a balance between incentive and competition.  
Patent and copyright laws, for example, insulate creators from copying creative works or 
inventions for a defined term, in order to provide them with an incentive to create works 
that ultimately are relegated to the public.  Trademark law targets free riding only if it 
misleads consumers and thus distorts information in the marketplace.  While one might 
imagine an argument that a merchandising right helps to provide financial support for 
trademark holders’ primary activity, such an argument turns on unfounded assumptions 
that such support is necessary and appropriate, and that information-based trademark law 
is the best vehicle to provide it.  See infra note __. 
79   Rochelle Dreyfuss has derided such assumptions as “if value, then right.”  Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 405 (1990).  See also Felix Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 815 
(1935) ("The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal 
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a 
sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected."); William P. 
Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 
199, 203-04 (1991). 
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A. Harms of a Broad Merchandising Right 
Why not grant trademark owners a right to control merchandising of their logos?  
The answer begins with the fundamental justification of trademark law: improving the 
functioning of the market by reducing consumer search costs.  From a search costs 
perspective, a general merchandising right unmoored from confusion conflicts with, 
rather than promoting, trademark law’s pro-competitive goals.  If consumers are not 
duped into believing that a trademark-bearing product was either sponsored or made by 
the trademark holder,80 then the quality of product-related information in the marketplace 
has not suffered from the use.81  And the overarching goal of market competition will 
only gain:  the unlicensed product will presumably compete in the marketplace with any 
licensed versions, bringing prices down, letting consumers choose higher-quality 
products with identical logos, and generally benefiting the consumer.  On balance, then, 
non-confusing uses of marks on merchandise serve, rather than impede, competition in 
the marketplace, thus promoting the overall goals of trademark and unfair competition 
law. 
Trademark law facilitates market competition by permitting consumers to find 
                                                 
80 Compare Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Universal Brass, Inc., 1995 WL 420816, at *3 
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (finding confusion based on use of registered Porsche trademark, 
together with ® symbol, which suggested official sponsorship by Porsche); cf. Bi-Rite 
Enters, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (suggesting 
that confusion as to sponsorship of band paraphernalia may exist when the merchandise 
is sold at concerts and other contexts in which consumers may assume official 
sponsorship). 
81 See, e.g., Board of Governors of University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. 
Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (“In essence, the court is skeptical that those individuals 
who purchase unlicensed tee-shirts bearing UNC-CH’s marks care one way or the other 
whether the University sponsors or endorses such products or whether the products are 
officially licensed.”). 
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products cheaply and quickly by relating advertising and their own experiences to the 
products they buy.  An infringement of a trademark is one that increases consumer search 
costs, normally by confusing consumers.  Trademarks can extend not only to words and 
logos, but to trade dress and even the color or shape of a product.  But trademark law 
does not give rights over an entire product class, because doing so would short-circuit the 
very market competition trademark law is supposed to protect.82  Similarly, a 
merchandising right would give rights over irreplaceable product features, which 
inevitably increases the cost of those products.  If only one company controls the sale of 
Seattle Seahawks T-shirts, those shirts will cost more and be of worse quality than if the 
market competes to provide those shirts.83  Consumers lose something tangible – they pay 
more for the shirt, or they are unable to express their support for the Seahawks because 
they can’t afford the shirt, or they get a lower quality shirt.  There must be some reason 
for the law to compel that loss. 
The Boston Hockey approach has no logical stopping point.  It conflicts with the 
text of the Lanham Act, which makes infringement turn not on mental association, but on 
confusion, deception, or mistake.84 More significantly, it leaves us without an effective 
standard for determining when a use of a trademark is legal.  The merchandising right 
                                                 
82   See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (refusing to 
protect product configurations as trademarks unless consumers view them as such); 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (refusing to extend 
trademark protection to aspects of products that improve their performance). 
83   See Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with Vanna, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 783, 
788-89 (1996).   
84 45 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a), 1125(a); see generally Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to 
Evoke, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 291 (2003). 
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cases seem to stem from the unjust enrichment instinct that “if value, then right.”85  But 
as we have explained elsewhere, that instinct has no solid basis in public policy.86  It 
would make each of the countless “nominative uses” trademark law permits into 
infringements.87  And it would turn trademark law from a right designed to facilitate 
commerce into a right to control language, something the courts have repeatedly warned 
against given its troubling implications for both competition and free speech.88  College 
students and football fans couldn’t support their team unless they paid the required fee.89  
Newspapers might be at risk for using brand names or logos in connection with their 
stories.  Aqua couldn’t sing the song “Barbie Girl,”90 or Walking Mountain create art 
using Barbie dolls,91 even though consumers weren’t confused.  Individuals might even 
                                                 
85 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks as Language in the 
Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 405 (1990).  
86   See Dogan & Lemley, Keywords, supra note __; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note __. 
87 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 
1992) (permitting unlicensed use of a trademark to refer to its owner, even when used by 
the defendant for commercial advantage). 
88  See, e.g., CPC Int’l v. Skippy, Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000); Nissan Motor Co. v. 
Nissan Computer Corp., __ F.3d __, 2004 WL 1753289 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2004).  For a 
discussion of trademarks and the First Amendment, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 
147, 216-24 (1998). 
89 Cf. University Book Store et al. v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin, 1994 
WL 747886, at *10 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (prior to applying to register its marks with the 
Patent and Trademark Office, “Applicant, like numerous other colleges and universities, 
permitted others to sell imprinted merchandise as expressions of community support and 
goodwill.”); see generally Jeffrey Zaslow, Sports Fans Snap up Souvenirs of Winners 
Beating Losers:  Mascot Boiled or Grilled?, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at A1 
(describing the increased demand for “rivalry merchandise” mocking competitors’ 
mascots, and the growth in licensed versions of such products in which universities 
control the message). 
90   Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting this use). 
91   Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(permitting this use). 
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be liable for wearing tattoos or jewelry containing trademarked logos, or tattoo parlors for 
applying them.92 
Further, accepting free riding as the basis for a merchandising right would 
encourage courts more generally to focus on “free riding” and “trading on goodwill” as 
inherent evils,93 and to move toward a presumption of illegality for any use of someone 
else’s trademark.  Limiting doctrines like “trademark use” and perhaps even “nominative 
use” have already proven challenging for courts to apply because of the temptation to 
assume that any use of a trademark must necessarily be a bad one.  This doesn’t mean 
trademark law will lose all its defenses.  The First Amendment will continue to protect 
certain uses of a trademark, particularly in parody and news reporting.  But the structural 
limits on the scope of trademark and dilution law are intellectually harder to maintain if 
we simultaneously treat the same marks as pure property rights in the merchandising 
context. 
To be sure, we might try to cabin the merchandising right so that it doesn’t reach 
desirable uses.  But to do so we would need a theory of merchandising control that is 
broader than consumer search costs and the avoidance of confusion, but not as broad as 
                                                 
92   For a discussion of this possibility, see Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, 
Written on the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body 
Art, 10 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 97, 123-31 (2003).  Cotter and Mirabole conclude that the 
individual would not be liable under current law, and that the tattoo parlor shouldn’t be 
either, though the question is closer. 
93   A merchandising right seems more like a physical property right than traditional 
trademark law does.  For criticism of treating trademarks as property, see Mark A. 
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1697 
(1999).  But the two are not coextensive.  It is possible to treat trademarks as property in 
certain respects – for example, permitting them to be sold or used as security interests, 
see Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1267 
(2004) – without necessarily extending protection to any use of a logo.   
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unjust enrichment or appropriation of goodwill.  As we will find in the next sections, 
such a justification for the merchandising right is hard to come by. 
 
C. Preserving Existing Expectations 
Even absent a good theoretical justification for a broad merchandising right, 
advocates might fall back on a practical concern.  It seems clear that trademark owners 
assume they have a right to control merchandising.  Wouldn’t it upset the settled 
expectations of those trademark owners to suddenly nullify the right?  Similarly, might 
consumers be confused if they too believe that any T-shirt bearing a corporate logo is 
licensed by the corporation? 
  The first concern need not detain us long.  First, based on our review of the cases 
in Part I, it is far from clear that trademark owners are reasonable in assuming the 
existence of such a right.  The case law support for it has never been strong or 
unequivocal.  Second, there is no obvious investment that will be lost if the broad 
merchandising theory is rejected.  Trademark owners won’t lose their protection against 
consumer confusion or dilution.  Nor can the trademark owner make a plausible case that 
a competing sale of, say, Dallas Cowboys hats will weaken the connection between the 
mark and the team. True, the Cowboys might make less money than they would if 
trademarks were absolute property rights, and they might argue that this “discourages 
investment” in football. But so what? The point of trademark law has never been to 
maximize profits for trademark owners at the expense of competitors and consumers. 
And the investment at issue in these cases is not investment in the quality of the 
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underlying product (the team), but investment in merchandising the brand itself. As 
Ralph Brown quite sensibly suggested, this is not the goal of the law.94 
The consumer concern is a more significant one.  It is possible that consumers 
have come to expect that San Francisco Giants jerseys are licensed by the Giants, not 
because they serve a brand-identifying function, but simply because the law has 
sometimes required such a relationship.95  Indeed, the NFL cases we discussed above 
found evidence of this. If this expectation exists, consumers may be confused if the law 
changes. If so, a law based on eliminating consumer confusion may be obliged to give 
trademark owners the right to prevent such uses in order to avoid this confusion. 
Or perhaps not.  Glynn Lunney derides this sort of confusion argument as 
circular,96 and of course in some sense it is.  The idea that once-legal conduct becomes 
illegal simply because the public believes it is illegal seems like bootstrapping.97 But if 
we are committed to basing trademark doctrine on consumer reactions, we might be stuck 
                                                 
94. See Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of 
Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165, 1177-80 (1948). Others have echoed this view. See 
Felix Cohen, supra note __, at 815; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New 
Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 506-14 (1998); 
Heald, supra note __, at 791-92; Litman, supra note __, at __. 
95   Rob Denicola cites consumer surveys presented in merchandising cases that support 
this conclusion.  See Denicola, Freedom to Copy, supra note __, at 1668 n. 37.   
96   Lunney, supra note __, at __. 
97   Some courts have taken the merchandising right so far as to conclude that “consumer 
confusion” may occur where consumers are not in fact confused about the relationship 
between the two products, but nonetheless believe that the defendant might have needed a 
license to use the mark.  See Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 775 
(8th Cir. 1994); accord Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544-45 (5th 
Cir. 1998). For criticism of this approach, see, for example, Lunney, supra note 
(manuscript at 31, 43), who suggests that this approach is intellectually dishonest, and 
Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 
45 J. Copyright Soc’y 546, 624 (1998). 
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with those reactions even if bad legal decisions initially helped create them.  The real 
underlying issue is whether the trademark law should act here as a creator or as a 
reflector of societal norms.98  In the context of likelihood of confusion analysis, 
trademark law has traditionally adapted itself to reflect societal norms, rendering a use 
illegal if but only if it confuses consumers.  In other areas, however, trademark law acts 
as a norms creator, establishing standards that shape rather than merely respond to 
consumer beliefs.  The law creates certain limiting doctrines – genericide, trademark use, 
and fair use, for example – that constrain the scope of trademark rights and that exist 
whether or not the public is aware of them.99  Trademark’s norm-creation role is 
important because it prevents a downward spiral in which the court focuses on the most 
gullible consumers, lowering the standards and expectations of others.100  Rigorous 
application of these doctrines can affect consumer perceptions.  In effect, the law is 
leading rather than following consumer expectations.   
The merchandising theory presents a difficult problem in choosing between these 
functions.  On the one hand, the merchandising theory is an effort to expand the basic 
scope of trademark protection beyond its usual bounds.  Thus, it seems analogous to other 
limiting doctrines that are intrinsic to the law, not dependent on consumer expectations.  
                                                 
98   Graeme Dinwoodie, 43 Hous. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004); Dogan & Lemley, 
supra note __, at __. 
99   See Dogan & Lemley, supra note __, at __ (discussing the role of trademark law as a 
norms creator in creating limiting doctrines like trademark use).  There is currently a split 
in the circuits as to whether the fair use doctrine is independent of consumer confusion, 
or requires proof of the absence of confusion.  The Supreme Court will resolve that issue 
– and have an opportunity to address the norm creator/norm follower distinction – this 
year in the KP Holdings case. 
100   See Litman, Breakfast With Batman, supra note __, at __. 
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As Robert Denicola has pointed out, the role of trademark law as norms creator may be 
especially important in merchandising cases.  Unlike the ordinary trademark case, in 
which an infringing defendant can simply choose another mark and compete fairly in the 
relevant market, “a defendant enjoined from using a well-known insignia on T-shirts or 
caps is effectively excluded from the market.  It can sell to no one, including those who 
care not the slightest whether their Boston Red Sox cap is licensed or approved.”101  On 
the other hand, if it is correct that consumers now believe T-shirts are sponsored by the 
owner of the logos emblazoned on them, that assumption seems to fit within the 
likelihood of confusion analysis as to which trademark law has traditionally been a norms 
reflector.   
We are inclined to believe that this is a case in which the law should act as a 
norms creator.  In part this is because any consumer confusion is itself an artifact of legal 
cases that seemed to create a new merchandising right; arguably it should be up to the 
courts, not consumers, to undo the problems a few ill-considered decisions may have 
created.  This is particularly so when consumers’ belief that the law requires permission 
to use a logo may not matter at all to their assessment of the quality of the merchandise at 
issue, such as when the product prominently identifies its manufacturer.102  If individuals 
don’t “care one way or the other whether [the trademark holder] sponsors or endorses 
such products or whether the products are officially licensed,”103 then the competitive 
                                                 
101 Denicola, supra note __, at 613. 
102 Cf. Greater Anchorage, Inc. v. Nowell, 974 F.2d 1342 (Table) (9th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting merchandising claim, when “customers actually believed the pins were 
‘illegal.’  Thus, there is no evidence that people actually believe that [defendant’s] pins 
are associated with” plaintiff). 
103 Board of Gov. of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 
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process certainly does not suffer from their assumption that the use required a license. 
A second reason for courts not to blindly defer to consumer norms in 
merchandising cases is that the law can likely cure most confusion of this type without 
eliminating competition, simply by requiring a conspicuous disclaimer.  Some courts 
have tried to steer a middle ground by permitting such uses but requiring that the user 
take all reasonable steps to try to reduce confusion both at the point of purchase and post-
sale.104  Robert Bone suggests that the law should aggressively create norms here and rule 
that a disclaimer is the sole remedy in all merchandising cases.  We would not go that far.  
As we note in the next section, there may be rare instances of post-sale confusion that 
would not be cured by a disclaimer. 
How would a disclaimer-based analysis proceed?  As an initial matter, the 
plaintiffs would have to prove consumer confusion.  We haven’t seen sufficient evidence 
to persuade us that consumers do in fact think this way in a significant number of cases.  
A merchandising right based on a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship should 
require proof of likely consumer confusion, just as any other trademark infringement 
claim.105  If consumers don’t assume sponsorship from the use of a logo on a T-shirt, or if 
a conspicuous disclaimer would be sufficient to cure any such confusion, there is no basis 
for granting the trademark owner merchandising protection.  
                                                                                                                                                 
1989). 
104   See, e.g., Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1338-39 
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation).  See also Note, Promotional 
Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 Tex. L. 
Rev. 639, 664-69 (1984). 
105   See also Withers, supra note __, at 453 (arguing that merchandising should be illegal 
only where consumers are likely to be confused). 
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There are lots of famous marks and icons for which we have not granted 
merchandising rights. No one controls the exclusive right to make “Statue of Liberty” t-
shirts or paperweights, for example. And while consumers might make this assumption in 
the context of some famous marks, particularly in the field of professional sports,106 there 
are many more marks for which there is no evidence that consumers expect the trademark 
owner to be the only manufacturer.107  Even if we decide we cannot undo what some 
cases have done in the sports context, there is no reason to extend the merchandising right 
any further, since it is hard to find any theoretical or statutory basis for the property 
approach to trademarks.108 
One policy argument sometimes raised in favor of granting merchandising rights 
is that it provides needed financial support for the trademark owner.109  This is a slightly 
altered form of the argument that merchandise rights serve as incentives, an argument 
                                                 
106 The National Football League, in particular, has had considerable success in 
establishing that consumers assume it has licensed uses of NFL team logos and other 
trademarks.  See, e.g., National Football League v. Governor of the State of Delaware, 
435 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977) (“Apparently, in this day and age when 
professional sports teams franchise pennants, teeshirts, helmets, drinking glasses and a 
wide range of other products, a substantial number of people believe, if not told 
otherwise, that one cannot conduct an enterprise of this kind without NFL approval.”). 
107 See Denicola, supra note __, at 612 (“If the NFL successfully establishes a reputation 
for aggressively marketing its insignia, we may readily assume its sponsorship of book 
bags marked with the logo of the Dallas Cowboys, yet refrain from an analogous 
attribution of sponsorship for bags displaying the mascot of the local high school.”); see 
also id. (discussing other contexts in which assumption of sponsorship may be more 
likely, such as musician-related sales occurring at concert sites rather than at other 
locations). 
108 Judge Kozinski suggests that a case-by-case balancing approach is appropriate in these 
circumstances. See Kozinski, supra note __, at 971. 
109   See, e.g., Withers, supra note __, at __ (noting this argument). 
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that has been soundly refuted elsewhere.110  Merchandise may be an indirect way of 
subsidizing colleges and other trademark owners, though we are skeptical that the 
argument has much persuasive force when applied to corporations such as Nike or Coca-
Cola rather than to universities.  But if the goal of consumers is to contribute to the 
school, there are other, more direct ways of doing so.  Indeed, if consumers do in fact 
value obtaining goods from the trademark owner itself – perhaps because it supports the 
school or team – then we would expect the market to reflect that by developing a 
distinction between ordinary merchandise and officially licensed merchandise.  This may 
reflect the best of all worlds, because consumers will learn whether merchandise is 
sponsored by the trademark owner or not, and can choose their goods accordingly.111  A 
requirement of a conspicuous disclaimer would help such a market develop.  The 
emphasis in merchandising inquiries would appropriately shift, then, to whether the 
defendant had deceptively suggested that its goods were officially licensed by the 
trademark holder.112  That is something within the traditional competence of trademark 
                                                 
110   See, e.g., Veronica J. Cherniak, Ornamental Use of Trademarks: The Judicial 
Development and Economic Implications of an Exclusive Merchandising Right, 69 Tul. 
L. Rev. 1311, 1349-52 (1995).  Among other problems, Cherniak notes that unlike 
copyrighted works, there is no particular reason to encourage the creation of new 
trademarks; that trademark owners already have substantial incentive to invest in their 
brands because of the association between those brands and their products; and that there 
are other ways for companies to capitalize on the positive value of their goodwill. 
111   Scott Kieff even goes so far as to suggest that this distinction can replace copyright, 
because even without copyright customers will voluntarily choose to support favored 
artists.  F. Scott Kieff, The Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis 
of Intellectual Property Regimes (working paper 2004).  One does not have to go this far 
to believe that consumers may choose to support affinity groups by opting to purchase 
licensed products. 
112 See Denicola, supra note __, at 613; see, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. 
Diversified Packing Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 383 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding trademark violation 
when defendant’s advertisements contained cartoons similar to plaintiff’s cartoons and 
called for customers to “Buy Direct and Save”); Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman, Inc., 
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law, and a task courts are well-equipped to perform. 
We conclude, therefore, that the fact that consumers may believe trademark 
owners have a right to control merchandise bearing their brands doesn’t itself justify a 
merchandising right.  The issue is certainly not free from doubt, and we can readily 
imagine a court concluding that even if the merchandising theory is unpersuasive, we 
have gone too far down that road to turn back now.  But even if a court were to take that 
position, a limited, likelihood-of-confusion rationale for keeping a bad law intact is quite 
different from a theoretical justification for cementing and extending the merchandising 
right. 
 
D. The Scope of Counterfeiting Law 
A third concern with eliminating the merchandising right is that it might interfere 
with efforts to prevent certain types of counterfeiting.  Counterfeiting is the canonical 
case of trademark infringement.  A defendant copies the trademark owner’s brand or 
mark and affixes it to goods identical in appearance to the trademarked goods, passing its 
own goods off as the trademark owner’s.  There is no question that counterfeiting violates 
the trademark laws because it confuses consumers; indeed, it is also a crime.113  This 
                                                                                                                                                 
157 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (enjoining sale of unlicensed costumes whose 
boxes were stamped “official outfit”). 
113   18 U.S.C. § 2320.  It is worth noting, however, that that statute does not expand 
trademark liability, but rather provides that all the limitations on and defenses to the 
Lanham Act apply to it as well.  Id. § 2320(c).  At least one court has held that the statute 
does not apply to the sale of trademarks as products, rather than as labels for goods that 
imitate the trademark holder’s.  United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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form of passing off has little to do with a merchandising right, since ordinary trademark 
law seems perfectly well suited to deal with it. 
Suppose, however, that the circumstances of the counterfeit sale are sufficient to 
dispel any buyer confusion.  The example often cited is a fake Rolex watch bought on the 
street corner for $20.114  The buyer of the fake Rolex presumably doesn’t believe he is 
getting the real thing.  Nonetheless, there seems something intuitively wrong with 
permitting the copying of the Rolex trademark, even in circumstances where the buyer 
knows what they are getting.  Similarly, one might think that sellers of “knock-off” Prada 
handbags, Chanel perfumes, or Nike T-shirts are causing harm of some sort to the 
trademark owner, even if it is not the classic harm of displaced sales.  One benefit of a 
merchandising right would be to create a cause of action against those who copy 
trademarked goods even in the absence of consumer confusion. 
It’s worth exploring further the intuition that the copier’s conduct is wrongful.  
There seem four possible bases for such an intuition.  First, there may be concerns about 
actual confusion.  Take Nike.  Because Nike is an apparel manufacturer, consumers who 
see a T-shirt with the familiar “swoosh” on it may well assume that Nike is selling the T-
shirt, even if they really want the shirt because they think the swoosh looks cool, not 
because they think Nike makes high-quality clothing.  If consumers do in fact think Nike 
is selling the T-shirt, the likely legal effect will be that Nike gets control over the swoosh, 
at least on clothing.115  This control seems similar to what a merchandising right would 
                                                 
114   See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note __, at __. 
115   The issue here is a bit different from the norm creator-norm enforcer distinction we 
discussed above.  There, the question was whether consumers believed the mark must be 
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give.  But that is an accident of the fact that Nike is an apparel manufacturer, and it is 
reasonable to assume that they will make and sell T-shirts as well as shoes.  A right based 
on such actual confusion would not protect Nike against the use of swooshes on 
kitchenware; nor would it protect Coca-Cola against the use of its logo on T-shirts.  It is 
not a merchandising right, but simply an application of traditional principles of consumer 
confusion.  Further, this sort of traditional confusion may well be dispelled by an 
appropriately conspicuous disclaimer. 
A second concern that might justify a prohibition against copying of logos is the 
fear that even though the buyer isn’t confused, others might be.  Assuming that the $20 
fake Rolex looks like the real one, even if I know that I bought the fake one, others may 
not be able to tell the difference.  This in turn can cause harm; if people see Rolexes that 
don’t tell time well, or break, they may mistakenly attribute the shoddy quality of the 
counterfeit goods to the trademark owner.  Traditional trademark law deals with this 
problem under the rubric of “post-sale confusion.”  This was the situation in Lois 
Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co.116  There, Levi Strauss had registered not only its trade 
name and its jean labels, but also the pattern of stitching on the back pockets of its jeans.  
Lois Sportswear sold jeans with clearly different labels, but with an identical stitching 
pattern.  The trial court found that there was no evidence of actual confusion by 
purchasers, but that non-purchasers seeing the jeans "worn by a passer-by" would likely 
be confused.  The Second Circuit held that this post-sale confusion constituted trademark 
                                                                                                                                                 
licensed; here it is whether they believe Nike is actually selling the T-shirts.  The latter is 
closer to the core of consumer confusion, and the law presumably should respond to such 
a consumer belief. 
116   799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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infringement:  "The confusion the Act seeks to prevent in this context is that a consumer 
seeing the familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans with [Levis] and that 
association will influence his buying decisions."117  The doctrine of post-sale confusion 
can take care of a significant number of counterfeiting cases without the need for a 
merchandising right.  It is important not to assume that any use of a logo will inevitably 
confuse viewers after the sale, however.  Courts sometimes reject logo counterfeiting 
claims where it does not appear likely that consumers will be confused.118 
A third concern might exist even in the absence of post-sale confusion.  For 
certain types of goods – called Veblen goods – the value of the good to a consumers is a 
function of scarcity and corresponding exclusivity or “snob appeal.”  Veblen goods 
therefore exhibit a sort of anti-network effect; acquisition of the good by new consumers 
actually reduces the value of the good to existing owners.119  Judge Kozinski suggests 
that for Veblen goods, exclusive control over merchandising may help preserve the image 
consumers want to associate with the goods. Even if neither the buyer nor anyone else 
who sees them believes that counterfeit Rolex watches are real, if they proliferate it may 
destroy consumer expectations about what it means to wear a Rolex.120  There may 
therefore be a loss of social surplus resulting from competition, because counterfeiting a 
                                                 
117   Id. at __.  See also Car-Freshner Corp. v. Big Lots Stores Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 145 
(N.D.N.Y. 2004). 
118   See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1507 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting claim of counterfeiting of knock-off handbags where 
differences made consumers unlikely to be confused). 
119   See Stan Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on 
Copyright: The Roles of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects [draft at 6] (working 
paper December 2003) (modeling Veblen goods as a form of negative network effect). 
120   See Kozinski, supra note __, at 969-70; accord Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, 
Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 214 (1986). 
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Veblen good harms consumers of the true Veblen good in a way that counterfeiting a 
non-Veblen good does not.   
We are not fully persuaded that this economic concern justifies the creation of a 
merchandising right for Veblen goods.  By definition, the counterfeit goods in this 
category are ones that people don’t associate with Rolex; otherwise, they will be covered 
under the regular or post-sale confusion rationales discussed above.  If they don’t 
associate the counterfeit goods with Rolex, it is not clear that existing owners of Veblen 
goods will be harmed.  And consumers of the distinguishable knockoff will clearly 
benefit.121  Alternatively, even if this is a valid utilitarian rationale for a merchandising 
right, it does not extend beyond Veblen goods to normal goods. 
A final concern, and what may really be animating much of the push for 
merchandising protection, is an interest in protecting the product itself.  It is no accident 
that Rolex is the most often used example of counterfeiting, and that many of the other 
examples involve the exact duplication of products and not just brand names.  People’s 
sympathies are naturally aroused by the fact that the defendant is copying the plaintiff’s 
product almost exactly.  There seems something wrong with the defendant copying the 
plaintiff’s design, particularly if the economic effect may be for consumers to substitute 
the cheap knock-off for the more expensive genuine product.   
We think this final instinct, while understandable, is misplaced.  The Lanham Act 
                                                 
121  Cf. Shelly Branch, Style & Substance:  Hermes’s Jelly Ache, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 
2004, at B1 (describing demand for knockoffs of Hermes “jelly bags,” and suggesting 
that Hermes may have squeezed up prices of the knockoffs by aggressively pursuing 
sellers). 
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is not a design protection statute.  U.S. law gives limited protection for the actual design 
of a product through design patent law, copyright law, and sui generis protection for 
vessel hull designs.122  European law gives somewhat more protection.123  Each of those 
laws is animated by a desire to encourage the creation of new designs.  Further, each law 
is limited in duration, and the designs so protected eventually enter the public domain.  
Trademark law, by contrast, is ill-suited to serve as a design protection statute.  Its 
purposes are consumer protection and information disclosure, not encouraging creativity.  
Its protection lasts forever, and does not initially vest with the first creator, but rather the 
first to use the design to brand its goods.  One of the real risks of the merchandising 
theory is precisely that it will subvert the proper goals of trademark law and leave in its 
place an ill-tailored, overreaching form of judicial design legislation.   
  
 E. Can Dilution Save the Merchandising Right? 
Trademark law has recently expanded beyond its traditional scope of likelihood of 
confusion to protect the owners of certain famous marks against “dilution.”124  Could 
dilution provide a back-door way of obtaining merchandising rights for famous 
trademarks?  We think it is unlikely, for two reasons. 
First, the theoretical basis for a dilution claim does not cover merchandising. 
                                                 
122   See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (design patent law); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining 
“useful articles” subject to copyright protection); id. §§1301-1332 (Vessel Hull 
Protection Act). 
123   European Design Protection Directive, 98/71/EC (October 1998). 
124   15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
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Some have criticized dilution law for treating trademarks as property.125  But, properly 
understood, dilution is targeted at reducing consumer search costs just as traditional 
trademark law is.  Dilution takes two forms: blurring the distinctive significance of a 
mark by associating it with lots of different products, and tarnishing the image of the 
mark by associating it with unwholesome products.  Both blurring and tarnishment can 
make it somewhat more difficult for consumers to associate a famous mark with its 
owner.   
Merchandising uses do not blur the distinctive significance of a mark in the mind 
of consumers.  Rather, they reinforce it.  The University of Texas might suffer blurring of 
its brand if the color orange and the image of a longhorn with the intertwined letters 
“UT” were used as a trademark to sell unrelated goods.  But if the logo appears on T-
shirts worn by UT fans, that use strengthens the connection in the minds of the public 
between the logo and the University.  Merchandising uses are unlikely to create blurring 
problems. 
In certain cases trademark dilution law will protect the owners of famous marks 
against the use of their mark in a way that will tarnish the trademark.126  But tarnishment 
requires proof that the defendant used the mark to brand goods, not just that they used the 
                                                 
125   See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Monopolies in the Blue Nowhere, 28 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 1091 (2002); Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of 
Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 Trademark Rptr. 525 
(1995). 
126   See, e.g., Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(enjoining use of a poster using the Coca-Cola colors and font that read “Enjoy 
Cocaine”).   
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mark as the subject of a T-shirt.127  For example, if a defendant sells Toyota brand 
pornography, those who encounter the use may think less highly of the Toyota brand 
name because they subconsciously associate it with pornography, even if they understand 
that the car company did not itself sponsor the materials.  By contrast, an irate consumer 
wearing a T-shirt that says “Toyota sucks” or shows a cartoon character urinating on the 
Ford logo isn’t tarnishing the brand in the sense the law cares about.  These protest uses 
don’t interfere with consumers’ association between the logo and the company through 
some subconscious pollution.  If anything, they strengthen the mental connection 
between trademark holder and mark, albeit in a way the company might not like.  The use 
of logos on merchandise isn’t actionable as tarnishment, therefore, as long as the point of 
the logo is to refer to the trademark owner and not to brand an unrelated product.  To be 
sure, courts applying the tarnishment doctrine have sometimes used it to target criticism 
or derogatory speech about the trademark owner, a result that finds little justification in 
the search cost rationale.128  Those courts are clearly mistaken in their understanding of 
the doctrine, however, and most courts properly distinguish the two.129  
 Second, even if dilution theory were somehow stretched to cover merchandising, 
as a practical matter the federal dilution statute seems unlikely to provide the kind of 
protection against the use of logos that trademark owners desire.  First, the Supreme 
                                                 
127   See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (defining 
tarnishment); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § __.   
128   See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).   
129   See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 
2003); Mastercard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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Court in 2003 construed the statute as requiring trademark owners to prove actual 
dilution of the significance of their mark, rather than merely a likelihood of dilution, at 
least where the marks were not identical.130  As a practical matter demonstrating actual 
dilution has proven extremely difficult,131 rendering the federal dilution statute of little 
practical value to trademark owners.  Further, even if the likelihood of dilution standard 
were reinstated,132 the dilution law applies only to “commercial use in commerce” of the 
mark.133  This test requires use of the mark as a brand in proposing a commercial 
transaction,134 something that printing a logo on a T-shirt simply doesn’t do.  For all of 
these reasons, it seems unlikely that trademark owners will be able to use federal dilution 
law to justify a merchandising right.135 
 
                                                 
130   Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).  The Court twice distinguished 
the case of identical marks, but never held that they were subject to the likelihood of 
dilution standard. 
131   For examples of cases rejecting dilution claims after Moseley, see, e.g., Nitro Leisure 
Prods. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, 
Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003); Starbucks Corp. v. Lundburg, 2004 WL 1784753 (D. 
Or. Aug. 10, 2004); Mastercard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); HBP, Inc. v. American Marine Holdings, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1320 
(M.D. Fla. 2003).  The courts in General Motors Corp. v. Autovation Technologies, Inc., 
317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2004) and 7-Eleven Co. v. McEvoy, 300 F. Supp. 
2d 352 (D. Md. 2004) did find actual dilution under the Moseley standard in cases where 
the trademarks were identical. 
132   The International Trademark Association has proposed legislation to do just that. 
133   15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
134   See H.R. Rep. 104-374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (adopting existing constitutional 
standards of “commercial speech”). 
135   Moseley does not apply to state dilution statutes, and some of them might be 
interpreted more broadly than the federal act.  However, these statutes are still targeted at 
blurring and tarnishment, neither of which are properly at issue in the merchandising 
cases. 
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III. Merchandising Rights and the Supreme Court 
While the merchandising right might seem to be a fait accompli despite its 
dubious legal basis, recent developments suggest that the time may be right to reopen the 
debate.136  In particular, the Supreme Court’s trademark jurisprudence over the past 
decade has shown a return to core trademark values, with consumer expectations a central 
focus and the value of competition paramount.  At the very least, these cases validate the 
trend toward requiring confusion in merchandising cases, and away from the more 
generalized right enunciated in Boston Hockey and its progeny.   But they may go much 
further.  Beyond reaffirming an approach to trademark law heavily rooted in 
informational harm and consumer expectations, these opinions manifest a deep-rooted 
concern for the inherent value of competition in product markets.  If competitive markets 
are the ultimate goal, the solution, even in merchandising cases raising risks of 
sponsorship-based confusion, may lie in something short of an absolute injunction against 
use of the mark.137   
A. Consumer Perceptions and Confusion as to Source 
Beginning with our more modest contention, it seems clear that the current 
Supreme Court would reject a merchandising claim that did not turn on confusion as to 
source or sponsorship.  Over the past decade, the Court has insisted with increasing vigor 
                                                 
136   See Withers, supra note __, at 455-56. 
The debate over the merchandising right has raged since the mid-1970s, and many 
courts and commentators have contended that the right ignores both the confusion 
requirement and the need for competitors to have access to features that consumers find 
important to the appeal of a product.  See, e.g., [string cites].   
137 See generally Bone, supra note __ (advocating disclaimer as the exclusive remedy in 
merchandising cases generally). 
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that trademark rights and trademark infringement both depend upon consumer 
expectations and perceptions, rather than some abstract equitable code of conduct.  
Unless consumers perceive a mark as a brand, it does not merit protection; and unless 
consumers perceive a defendant’s use of the mark as an indication of product source or 
sponsorship, the use does not infringe.  These principles flow inevitably from trademark 
law’s emphasis on informational clarity and competition, and argue against a broad 
merchandising right for trademark holders. 
As to the first point, the Supreme Court has consistently held (and the Lanham 
Act requires)138 that trademark status depends on proof that consumers are likely to 
perceive the mark as a brand.  Absent a “consumer predisposition to equate the feature 
with the source,”139 the mark is not serving as a trademark, and its use by others cannot 
infringe. From a search costs perspective, this makes perfect sense:  unless a feature 
serves as a brand, its use by competitors will not confuse consumers as to the source or 
sponsorship of the competitors’ products, and the clarity of marketplace information will 
be unaffected.  Consumers, meanwhile, will benefit from competition among sellers of 
the feature.  And while the Court has held that some word marks and trade dress by their 
nature serve to indicate source,140 others – such as product configuration141 and color142 – 
                                                 
138 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining trademark as a symbol that “indicates the source” of a 
product, even if the source is unknown). 
139 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000); see also id. 
(“Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of 
product designs – such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin – is intended not to 
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or appealing.”). 
140 In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), the Court held that 
inherently distinctive trade dress could qualify for protection without a showing of 
secondary meaning.  To be “inherently distinctive,” however, the mark’s “intrinsic 
nature” must “serv[e] to identify a particular source of a product” – i.e., consumers must 
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are presumed to serve an aesthetic rather than source-identifying function until secondary 
meaning is established.143  The Court’s focus on consumer perceptions follows from 
trademark law’s competition-based rationale:  absent some indication that a competitor’s 
use of a product feature will confuse consumers and therefore increase their search costs, 
competition in that feature will best serve the interests of the public.144 
This consumer-perceptions-based eligibility standard has both direct and indirect 
implications for merchandising claims.  Doctrinally, it suggests that a trademark holder 
cannot establish distinct rights in the mark as a trademark for merchandise145 without 
                                                                                                                                                 
perceive it as a brand, albeit one with which they may not yet be familiar.  505 U.S. at 
768; see also id. at 769 (citing Restatement, Third, of Unfair Competition § 13 & 
comment (a)); Restatement, Third, of Unfair Competition § 13(a) (a mark is “inherently 
distinctive” if, “because of the nature of the designation and the context in which it is 
used, prospective purchasers are likely to perceive it as a designation that … identifies 
goods or services produced or sponsored by a particular person, whether known or 
anonymous”) (emphasis added); id. comment (b) (defining inherently distinctive marks 
as designations that “by their nature are likely to be perceived by prospective purchasers 
as symbols of identification that indicate an association with a particular source”). 
141 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
142 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).  In Qualitex, the Court 
held that a product’s color could serve as a trademark, but only “where that color has 
attained ‘secondary meaning’ and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand 
(and thus indicates its ‘source’)”.  514 U.S. at 163.  Because color “does not immediately 
… signal a brand or a product ‘source,’” id. at 162-63, its protection depends upon 
evidence of actual consumer perceptions.   
143 A mark has acquired secondary meaning when, “as a result of its use, prospective 
purchasers have come to perceive it as a designation” of source or sponsorship of the 
goods on which it appears.  Rest. (Third) of Unfair Comp. § 13(b).   
144 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) 
(“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the 
utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that 
facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent 
distinctiveness.”). 
145  Trademark holders have asserted two distinct types of merchandising claims.  First, 
some have claimed that they have established rights over a mark as used on merchandise, 
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proving that consumers are likely to view it as a source indicator,146 rather than as an 
inherently pleasing feature, when they see it incorporated into licensed products.147  If 
this standard turns – as it should – on evidence rather than supposition, it will rarely be 
met in a trademark merchandising case.148  More generally, the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
either through common law usage (or licensing) or through registration, and that the 
defendant’s use confuses consumers based on that merchandise-based brand.  E.g., 
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 
651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (imposing requirement of secondary meaning as to 
sponsorship, which “requires a showing that the public believes that the product bearing 
the mark is sponsored or endorsed by plaintiff,” and finding requirement satisfied based 
on survey evidence).  This approach gives trademark holders a considerable advantage in 
establishing likelihood of confusion, which weighs heavily the relatedness of goods 
offered by the two parties.  See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 30 
(1st Cir. 1989) (finding confusion likely based partly on the fact that the BAA and 
defendant “offer virtually the same goods:  shirts and other wearing apparel”).   
 Alternatively – and more commonly – merchandising claims are based on the 
trademark holder’s rights in its primary market for sports, education, entertainment, and 
the like.  The trademark holder in such a case must establish that the defendant’s use 
confuses consumers despite the differences in products offered under the mark.  See, e.g., 
Board of Gov. of Univ. of N. Carol. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 172-73 (M.D. 
N.C. 1989) (agreeing “with Professor McCarthy that similarity or even identity of marks 
is not sufficient to establish confusion where non-competitive goods are involved”); 
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 719-20 (W.D. Pa. 
1983). 
146 By “source indicator,” we mean an indication of source or sponsorship. 
147 See University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 717 (W.D. 
Pa. 1983) (“Although there may be some evidence in the record which would tend to 
suggest that the Pitt insignia have taken on a secondary meaning for the provision of 
educational and athletic services, there is simply no evidence that the Pitt insignia ever 
have had any secondary meaning for soft goods.”); compare National Football League 
Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 
1982) (imposing requirement of secondary meaning as to sponsorship, which “requires a 
showing that the public believes that the product bearing the mark is sponsored or 
endorsed by plaintiff,” and finding requirement satisfied based on survey evidence).  
148 Indeed, it is rarely even asserted.  See Board of Gov. of Univ. of N. Carol. v. 
Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 172 & n.2 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (treating merchandising 
case as one involving unrelated goods, despite University’s sale of merchandise in its 
bookstore, because sale of such merchandise “is not the primary business of the 
University”); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 717 
(W.D. Pa. 1983); cf. University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 
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faithfulness to a consumer-based approach to trademark law reaffirms the traditional 
notion of trademark law as a facilitator of fair competition, rather than a property-based 
regime, and implicitly rejects the unjust enrichment impulse reflected in Boston Hockey 
and its progeny.149  
Admittedly, the eligibility cases do not directly address the core question in many 
merchandising cases:  whether infringement requires real likelihood of confusion as to 
product source, or whether it’s enough to show that the public recognizes the trademark 
as emanating from the complaining party.  But the Court has recently given clear 
guidance on this question in two other cases.  First, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, the 
Court rejected the idea that mere mental association between the plaintiff’s trademark and 
the defendant’s product could suffice to prove dilution of that trademark.150  And if 
mental association is not enough to satisfy the dilution standard, it certainly won’t be 
enough to show likelihood of confusion.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(11th Cir. 1985) (adopting Boston Hockey approach, and finding lack of product 
proximity “less significant in the instant case,” where “the confusion stems not from the 
defendant’s unfair competition with the plaintiff’s products, but from the defendant’s 
misuse of the plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill as embodied in the plaintiff’s mark”).  
But see Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 28-30 (1st Cir. 1989) (asserting 
without further discussion that “apparel is related to the service provided by the BAA, the 
race, and BAA is entitled to enjoin use of its mark on such items,” and going on to 
analyze likelihood of confusion under a related-goods approach). 
149  See generally Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 
(2001) (“protection for trade dress exists to promote competition”) (emphasis added); 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (trademark law “seeks 
to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation”).  Compare University Book 
Store v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *8 (TTAB 
1984) (describing as “antiquated” the “view of trademarks as harmful monopolies which 
must be rigorously confined within traditional bounds”). 
150   Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).    
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Second, the Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp.,151 directly refutes the idea that infringement can occur without confusion as to the 
source or sponsorship of the goods, and discredits the notion that any other form of 
mental association counts in evaluating infringement.  Dastar involved a “reverse 
passing-off” claim based on the sale of videotapes containing a movie created by the 
plaintiff, but sold under the defendant’s name.  The plaintiff contended that defendant 
deceived the public into thinking that it, rather than plaintiff, had made the movie, and 
that the sale of the movie under defendant’s name constituted a false designation of origin 
under the Lanham Act.152  The Court rejected this theory, reasoning that “origin … of 
goods” under the Lanham Act refers to the origin of the physical product sold in the 
marketplace, rather than any ideas or communications included inside:   
We think the most natural understanding of the ‘origin’ of ‘goods’ – the source of 
wares – is the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace, in this 
case the physical … video sold by Dastar.  The concept might be stretched … to 
include not only the actual producer, but also the trademark owner who 
commissioned or assumed responsibility for (‘stood behind’) production of the 
physical product.  But as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is 
in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or 
communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.153 
While most merchandising claims involve allegations of confusion as to product 
                                                 
151 539 U.S. 23. 
152 Id. at 27; see 17 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (providing a cause of action against a “false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which … is likely to cause confusion … as to the origin … of his 
or her goods”).  The Dastar case was complicated by the fact that copyright in the movie 
had expired, leaving the movie in the public domain.  Id. at 26.  The Court did not limit 
its analysis to cases involving expired copyrights, however, and subsequent decisions 
have not read it that narrowly.  See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. 
Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
153 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32. 
Merchandising Right  Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
 54 
sponsorship, rather than origin, the Dastar reasoning has no less force in the sponsorship 
context.  To succeed in a sponsorship claim after Dastar, a trademark holder must 
establish that defendant’s use of its mark will confuse consumers into believing it 
sponsored the good sold by defendant.  In merchandising cases, this means that the 
trademark holder must establish that consumers are likely to believe that it makes or 
stands behind the t-shirt, cap, or other merchandise at issue in the case.  Boston Hockey’s 
notion that infringement can turn on confusion as to source of the mark – i.e., of “the 
ideas or communications” embodied in the product154 – runs directly counter to this 
ruling.155   
Indeed, Dastar seems particularly applicable in the merchandising context.  When 
fans buy Harvard shirts, or Chicago Cubs hats, or Rolling Stones tattoos, or Winnie-the-
Pooh cakes from the local bakery, they are doing so not because they believe that 
Harvard or the other trademark holders made or sponsored the good, but because the 
trademark in this context serves an important communicative function for them.156  Just 
                                                 
154 Id. 
155 See Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (“The certain knowledge of the buyer that 
the source and origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement 
of the act.”). 
156 This is arguably truer in merchandising cases than in cases involving books, movies, 
and other creative works like the film in Dastar itself, in which consumers are arguably 
interested “not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer of the physical tome (the 
publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in the identity of the creator of the story it 
conveys.” 539 U.S. at 32.  While acknowledging this tension, the Supreme Court in 
Dastar found its approach critical to preserving the balance between trademark and 
copyright law.  See id. at 33.  In any event, its reasoning clearly applies to products 
valued for something other than their intellectual content.  See id.  The basic premise – 
that consumer expectations need to be taken into account before deciding that the use of 
the mark misleads the public as to source or sponsorship – translates readily into the 
merchandising context. 
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as in Dastar, the communication may come in the form of material protected by 
copyright,157 or it may not; but the use of the trademark is unlikely to tell consumers 
anything about the source of the goods bearing the mark, as opposed to the source of the 
trademark or logo itself.  And absent such an association, trademark law should have 
nothing to say about the use of the mark.  Lower courts interpreting Dastar have applied 
it rigorously in such contexts, rejecting claims for passing off where the origin of the 
goods is not in question, even if the plaintiff claims the underlying work originated with 
him.158 
Dastar reiterates the principle that has driven Supreme Court trademark 
jurisprudence in recent years:  trademark law aims primarily to reflect consumer 
perceptions about brands and to validate their expectations as to the source of goods in 
the marketplace.  Together with Moseley, it makes it clear that the Court would, at the 
very least, make a showing of confusion a necessary condition to any merchandising 
claim.159 Read most broadly, they could require proof that it matters to consumers 
                                                 
157 Winnie the Pooh, for example, still enjoys copyright protection, and the use of its 
image may raise copyright concerns. 
158   See, e.g., Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251-52 (1st Cir. 2004); Bob Creeden & 
Assoc. v. Infosoft Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2004 WL 830456 (N.D. Ill. April 14, 2004); 
Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971-72 (N.D. Ill. 
2003) (“There was no misrepresentation as to the ‘origin’ of the tables, … because there 
was no misrepresentation, express or implied, as to the source of the components of the 
tables.”). 
159 See Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(finding no infringement when defendants rightly identified themselves as “the ‘origin’” 
of film “insofar as that term is used to define the manufacturer or producer of the physical 
goods that were made available to the public,” even though the film contained plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted material). 
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whether the trademark holder has officially sponsored merchandise bearing its mark.160  
As the Supreme Court stated in Dastar, “The words of the Lanham Act should not be 
stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”161 
 
B. Functionality and the Costs of Trademark Rights 
In addition to firming up the connection between trademark infringement and 
marketplace clarity, the Court’s recent jurisprudence has shown a renewed emphasis on 
the costs of trademark protection, and has suggested that these costs may sometimes 
justify a refusal to grant relief even when the plaintiff has produced a risk of confusion.  
In particular, the Court has underscored the importance of trademark’s functionality 
doctrine in maintaining competitive markets.  As discussed above, the functionality 
doctrine prevents a trademark holder from claiming rights to a feature if it is “‘essential 
to the use or purpose of the article or affects the cost or quality of the article,’ that is, if 
exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.”162  And while the contours of the functionality doctrine have proven 
challenging to fix, its basic rationale is simple:  for a competitive marketplace to function, 
competitors must have access to product features that consumers want for their inherent 
                                                 
160 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing trademark law as norms 
reflector or creator); see also University of North Carolina v. Halpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 
167, 173 (“In essence, the court is skeptical that those individuals who purchase 
unlicensed tee-shirts bearing UNC-CH’s marks care one way or the other whether the 
University sponsors or endorses such products or whether the products are officially 
licensed.”). 
161 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. 
162 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 & n.10 (1982)). 
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value, not because they indicate source.163 
The functionality doctrine appears perfectly suited for the merchandising context.  
In many – perhaps most – merchandising sales, competitors cannot satisfy consumers’ 
demand by substituting an alternative product feature for the trademark; because the 
trademark effectively is the product, consumers will settle for nothing less than it.164  The 
trademark therefore undeniably “affects the cost or quality of the article” and gives an 
insurmountable competitive advantage to the trademark holder.  Applying this reasoning, 
a number of merchandising cases have used functionality as one basis for denying the 
trademark holder’s claim.165   
The standard for functionality has long been a matter of dispute, however, 
particularly as applied to ornamentation rather than actual performance characteristics – 
so-called “aesthetic functionality.”  Under some articulations, the standard gives 
trademark holders some traction in arguing against its application.  The Supreme Court 
                                                 
163 See id. at 170. 
164 A Chicago Cubs fan seeking a baseball cap will not be satisfied with a hat with any 
other feature, regardless of competitors’ efforts to devise aesthetically attractive designs.  
Compare W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 1985) (asserting 
that “it would be unreasonable to deny trademark protection to a manufacturer who had 
the good fortune to have created a trade name, symbol, or design that became valued by 
the consuming public for its intrinsic pleasingness as well as for the information it 
conveyed about who had made the product,” and charging competitors with responsibility 
to create alternative attractive products). 
165 E.g., International Order of Job’s Daughers v. Lindenburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (“[I]n the context of this case, the name and emblem are functional aesthetic 
components of the jewelry, in that they are being merchandised on the basis of their 
intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship.”); University of Pittsburgh 
v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 720-21 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (“Because the Pitt 
insignia on soft goods serve a functional purpose and largely define a sub market of some 
size, granting Pitt the relief it seeks would give Pitt a perpetual monopoly over that sub 
market, precluding any competition in the Pitt insignia soft goods market.”). 
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has sometimes described functional features as those whose competitive advantage 
derives from their inherent qualities and not because of the reputation of the trademark 
holder.166  Seizing on this language, some courts have rejected the functionality 
doctrine167 in merchandising cases, reasoning that because the very appeal of trademark 
merchandise lies in the reputation reflected in the trademark, the marks by definition 
cannot be declared functional.168   
The problem with this rationale lies in its overly broad understanding of the type 
of “reputation-related advantage” that can make a feature non-functional.  It seems clear 
that the Court’s distinction between functional and non-functional features aims to 
differentiate between features that confer a competitive advantage because of their 
inherent nature, on the one hand, and those that do so because they indicate something 
about the source of the product, on the other.169  The type of “reputational advantage” 
that a non-functional mark confers, in other words, is in conveying valuable information 
                                                 
166 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (referring to “non-reputation-related advantage” 
conferred by functional features); id. at 169 (“The functionality doctrine thus protects 
competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that 
trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely, their inability reasonably to 
replicate non-reputation-related product features.”) (emphasis added). 
167 Technically, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the non-functionality of its 
trademark, but given the unusual nature of the functionality issue in merchandising cases 
– the mark claimed to be functional is admittedly a protected trademark – defendant 
typically raise the issue in these cases.  After it does so, however, plaintiff bears the 
burden of establishing non-functionality. 
168 See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(describing functionality argument as “paradoxical …, since it is precisely the fact that 
the symbols provide identification that make them ‘functional’ in the sense urged by Gay 
Toys, while Warner’s exclusive right to use its own identifying symbols is exactly what it 
seeks to protect.”). 
169 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (suggesting a feature is functional if it “plays an 
important role in making a product more desirable”). 
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to consumers about the reputation or qualities of the trademark holder as source or 
sponsor of the product.  The Restatement of Unfair Competition establishes this quite 
clearly.170  An alternative reading would conflict with the lesson in Dastar that, when 
trademark law talks about source or origin, it refers to the source or origin of the goods at 
issue in a case, and not of their ingredients or other attributes.  It would also conflict with 
the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of the functionality doctrine in TrafFix, 
where the Court clearly contemplated a co-equal role for traditional and aesthetic 
functionality.171 
Nonetheless, there may be merchandising cases in which the trademark serves as 
both source-identifier and as a critical feature of the product, so that it confers both 
reputation-related and non-reputation-related advantage to those who use it.172  In these 
cases, the ultimate competitive effect of allowing trademark rights may be difficult to 
gauge:  on the one hand, the reputational concerns may drive some purchasers mistakenly 
to assume an affiliation between the parties and thereby increase search costs; but on the 
other, the absence of competition may force consumers to pay a premium for the good, 
even when many of them don’t particularly care whether the product was officially 
licensed.  
If the Supreme Court’s recent analysis of functionality is any guidance, the 
                                                 
170  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17 (1995) (“A design is functional” if it 
“affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with 
which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s significance 
as an indication of source, that are important to effective competition by others and that 
are not practically available through the use of alternative designs.”) (emphasis added). 
171   Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001).  
172 Wichita Falls, for example, may be one such case. 
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solution in these cases should lie short of enjoining the mark.  The Court has stated 
unequivocally that functional features may not be protected under trademark law, even if 
they have also come to indicate source.173  For features that actually help to make the 
product work better, this is true without regard to their impact on competition.174  But 
even for features that are “aesthetically functional,” the Court has suggested that 
competitors must have access to the feature if the alternative would leave competitors at a 
disadvantage beyond that attributable to reputation.175 
None of this suggests an open season on the use of trademarks on merchandise.  
As discussed above, there may be occasions in which such use will create confusion that 
could affect the trademark holder’s reputation and cannot be dispelled with a 
disclaimer.176  Even in other cases involving sponsorship rather than source confusion, 
the particular usage at issue may imply the kind of official sponsorship that justifies 
judicial relief.  Claims of official sponsorship are clearly not functional; the advantage 
they confer comes exclusively through reputational concerns rather than aesthetic or 
communicative ones.  But in other instances, the functionality doctrine suggests that the 
public should have the benefit of competition in the sale of products that they desire, 
including products whose primary aesthetic feature constitutes a trademark.  If – and only 
if – such competition risks creating misperceptions as to whether the trademark holder 
                                                 
173 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (“Functionality having been established, whether MDI’s dual 
spring design has acquired secondary meaning need not be considered.”). 
174 Id.  
175 See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169-70; TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (aesthetic functionality 
turns on whether the feature confers a substantial advantage unrelated to reputation). 
176 Post-sale confusion is an example, as is the use of logos on items related to the 
trademark holder’s primary market.  See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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endorsed the product, the solution lies in correcting those misperceptions through 
disclaimers and corrective advertising, and not through enjoining use of the mark.   
The Supreme Court’s recent zeal for competition in trademark cases thus lends 
both theoretical and doctrinal muscle to the cause against a merchandising right.  At the 
very least, the Court’s recent decisions discredit the notion that a merchandising right can 
exist without any showing of confusion or other search-cost-related harm.  But they may 
go further:  the Court’s repeated emphasis on the importance of competition and 
consumer interests suggests that when a trademark is integral to the appeal of a good or 
class of goods, competitors should be allowed to sell it, as long as they make their 
unofficial status clear. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
While trademark owners, competitors, and perhaps even consumers act as though 
the merchandising theory is a fait accompli, where the courts are concerned it is 
ultimately a rather fragile theory.  Judicial adoption of the theory has never been 
universal or even widespread.  And the Supreme Court seems to have a firm idea of what 
trademark law is about, a vision that leaves no room for a merchandising right.  It seems 
likely, therefore, that courts considering merchandising claims in the future will not be 
inclined to uphold them absent special circumstances.   
We don’t believe this should be cause for alarm.  The merchandising theory has 
not been persuasive to courts in large measure because its justifications lack persuasive 
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force.  The arguments normally advanced for a merchandising right are circular and 
ultimately rather empty.  Most of the good a merchandising right might do can be 
accomplished more directly using existing trademark doctrines such as post-sale 
confusion.  Thus, we would eliminate the presumption of a merchandising right and put 
courts to the task of determining whether, under the circumstances, a particular use was 
in fact likely to confuse consumers as to source.  If not, the competitor ought to have 
access to the mark as product without incurring the cost of labeling itself as an 
“unofficial” product.  If confusion is likely, a disclaimer will ordinarily resolve it.  We 
can imagine some circumstances in which the risk of post-sale confusion would justify an 
injunction, but they will be the rare cases.  Most cases of consumer confusion can be 
solved without a merchandising right.  And where there is no consumer confusion at all, 
the assertion of a pure right to control use of a mark for no other reason than because it is 
“mine” is at odds with trademark theory and good public policy.  Consumers don’t need 
it, the statute doesn’t support it, and we are well rid of it. 
 
